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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Alternative Dispute Resolution movement of the last quarter of
a century has been built on the pillar of party autonomy.1 Indeed, the
very predicate of the movement is that parties can do a better job of
resolving their disputes through private ordering than public courts can
through public ordering.
In this regard, arbitration is no different than negotiation, mediation,
or any other alternative dispute resolution process. Among other things,
arbitration empowers parties to choose to opt out of public ordering from
the outset, to choose their decision makers, to decide which issues those
decision makers will adjudicate, to determine the standards the decision
maker will use in deciding the dispute, and even to decide whether the
1.

See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note 1 (reflecting the

importance of party autonomy in the arbitration context by listing it as the first principle
that guided the drafters of the Act). For similar evidence in the mediation context, see
Uniform Mediation Act, Prefatory Note 1 ("[Act] promotes the autonomy of the
parties."). For a discussion of the democratic character of the autonomy consideration in
dispute resolution, see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The
Problem ofArbitration,67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004).
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decision that is ultimately rendered will be supported by reasons. All of
this makes arbitration a very flexible process, readily adaptable by
parties to accommodate their needs and interests.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is the primary statute
regulating commercial arbitration in the United States.3 The FAA
governs all arbitrations that are conducted pursuant to a written
4
arbitration agreement and that are about a subject that affects commerce,
broadly construed.5 Historically, arbitrations under the FAA have been
thought to be final and binding,6 meaning that they are not subject to
substantive review for errors of law or fact. In recent years, however,
some parties have expanded their autonomy over the process by
contractually agreeing to permit courts to engage in substantive review,
sometimes called "enhanced judicial review" or "contracted judicial
review," 7 of arbitral awards under the FAA for errors of law.
In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 8 the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved a clear and deep split in the circuits and emphatically rejected
this practice. This decision constitutes arguably the most significant
constraint on party autonomy in arbitration that the Court has imposed. 9
This holding by the Court was a landmark in and of itself. But in so
ruling, the Court also staked out three additional important mileposts for
arbitrations conducted under the FAA. First, the Court held that the
grounds for judicial review under the FAA are limited to those grounds
that are specifically enumerated in the statute.10 This is significant
because the decision affects the many so-called "non-statutory" grounds
for judicial review of arbitration awards under the FAA, such as manifest

2. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION & LAWYERS 652-54 (3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter RISKIN].

3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
4. 9 U.S.C § 1 (2006).
5. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (endorsing
a reading of the FAA that extends the reach of the Act to the limits of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause).
6. See LARRY E.EDMONSON, GABRIEL M. WILNER & MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1:1,

1-1 (rev. ed. 2007); IAN R MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW 2:3, 2.1.1 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter MACNEIL].
7. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 81 (2006) ("Party self-autonomy values are advanced by decisions willing

to enforce contractually enhanced review." Brunet also specifically refers to such review
as "enhanced judicial review.").
8. 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008).
9. See id. at 1406-08.
10. See id. at 1400 ("The question here is whether statutory grounds for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract. We hold that the statutory
grounds are exclusive.").
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disregard of the law and public policy." Second, the Court continued to
open the door for parties to consider grounding their arbitrations in
mechanisms other than the FAA, such as state arbitration law.' 2 This is
significant because conventional wisdom has long held that state
arbitration law was largely preempted by the FAA. Finally, the Court
held that the finality goals of arbitration outweigh the freedom of
contract of participants. 13
The Court's ruling was surprising to some, especially because the
Court had previously held that party autonomy, not efficiency, was the
touchstone of arbitration under the FAA. 14 The ruling was also
surprising in that it significantly constrains courts in their ability to
reverse egregious arbitration awards, limiting them to grounds
specifically enumerated in the FAA and that do not include substantive
review.
In this article, I will explore why the Court came to these
conclusions, consider the state of vacatur law after the opinion, and
address some of the more salient policy issues that lie in the wake of the
decision. In Part II, I will provide a brief overview of vacatur under the
Federal Arbitration Act before Hall Street. In Part III, I will focus on the
Hall Street case, discussing the notion of contracted judicial review, the
facts of the case, and the Court's decision. I will offer three rationales
for explaining the Court's opinion: the triumph of the New Textualist
model of statutory interpretation (at least for this case), pragmatic
considerations, and process characteristics and values theory, which I
incorporate throughout this article. In Part IV, I will describe the state of
vacatur law after the Court's opinion, and provide my own insights into
how courts should handle certain controversial issues likely to arise. In
particular, I will argue that after Hall Street none of the non-statutory
grounds for review of arbitration awards should be available, with the
11. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)
(violates public policy); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (manifest disregard of
the law), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir.
2001) (award may be vacated if "not susceptible of the arbitrator's interpretation");
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11 th Cir. 2000) (arbitrary and
capricious); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 331 (1 st Cir. 2000) (award
may be vacated if contrary to the "plain language" of the contract).
12. The court began this process in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). See infra note xx and accompanying text. See generally
STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 40-44 (2d ed. 2007).

13. See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405 ("Instead of fighting the text, it makes more
sense to see the [FAA] as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just
the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.").
14. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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exception of the public policy ground. In Part V, the conclusion, I will
argue that rather than shrinking personal autonomy, the Court actually
expanded it by pointing to avenues in which it may be expressed,
including in the form of contracted judicial review. These avenues point
to mischief for arbitration, however, as they allow for the evisceration of
arbitration finality, a cornerstone of the process under the FAA. Courts
and legislatures should resist the temptation to permit contracted judicial
review, even in these avenues opened up by the Supreme Court in Hall
Street.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The FederalArbitrationAct

The FAA was enacted in 1925 to reverse legislatively the historic
"ouster doctrine," a centuries-old common law doctrine under which
courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 15 The heart of the act is
Section 2, which provides that arbitration agreements will be enforced
just like any other agreement, as long as the agreement is enforceable as
a matter of contract law. 16 The remaining sections compel courts to
support the arbitration process as Congress envisioned it in 1925. For
example, Section 4 of the Act permits a court to compel an unwilling
party into arbitration if it is satisfied that there is an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate, 17 and Section 3 permits it to stay related legal
an arbitrator to
proceedings. 18 Section 7 of the FAA also permits
19
arbitration.
the
during
witnesses
summon and hear
Critically, for our purposes, Section 9 permits the arbitrator to issue
an award that may be entered as a court judgment if one of the parties so
requests, and indeed requires courts to confirm an award, unless it is
vacated, modified, or corrected under Sections 10 or 11.20 Because the
Hall Street opinion construes Sections 10 and 11, it is worth looking at
them more closely.

15. For a definitive legislative history of the FAA, see generally IAN R. MACNEIL,
NATIONALIZATION,
LAW:
REFORMATION,
ARBITRATION
AMERICAN
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992) (a thorough review of the evolution of the American
arbitration law).

16.
17.
18.
19.

See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See id. §4.
See id. §3.
Seeid. §7.

20. See id. § 9. Section 13 prescribes the documentation that must be filed along
with a motion to confirm an arbitration award under Section 9. Id. § 13.
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The Statutory Groundsfor Vacatur

There are four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award
under the FAA, all of which are found in Section 10(a) of the FAA and
none of which were directly at issue in Hall Street. All four set a high
bar for proponents to meet, furthering the FAA's vision of arbitration as
a final and binding dispute resolution process.
Section lO(a)(1) provides for an award to be vacated "where the
award is procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means., 21 The standard
is high. For example, fraud under this section "must (1) be established
by clear and convincing evidence, (2) materially relate to an issue in the
arbitration, [and] (3) neither have been brought to the attention of the
arbitrator and the issue handled by them, nor have been discoverable
upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration. 2 2
Section (10)(a)(2) provides that an arbitral award may be vacated
"where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them., 23 In applying this provision, the courts have
distinguished between "active" and "passive" partiality.24 "Active
partiality" refers to actions by the arbitrator that demonstrate a
predisposition in favor or against one of the parties. 25 "Passive"
partiality refers to circumstances surrounding the arbitrator that may give
rise to inferences of partiality, even where there is no demonstration of
active partiality, such as an arbitrator's relationship with one of the
parties.26 Gaines Construction Co. v. Carol City Utilities, Inc.,27
provides an example of both. There, a Florida appeals court rejected the
arbitrator's dominance and control of one of the parties as a basis to
vacate because of active partiality, but agreed that a business relationship
21. Id. § 10(a)(2).
22. MACNEIL, supra note 6, § 40.2.2. See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
835 F.2d 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (award vacated when it was discovered that key plaintiff
witness on wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct had completely falsified his
credentials, and arbitrator clearly relied on this testimony in reaching a decision).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006).
24. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 6, § 28.1.3.
25. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER ET AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA 53 (2004) ("'Active' partiality-arbitrator statements or actions
that demonstrate animus or favoritism towards a party .. ")
26. See ESTREICHER, supra note 25 ("'[P]assive' partiality-that is, a relationship
between arbitrator and another participant that raises partiality concerns."); see also
Gaines Constr. Co. v. Carol City Utils., Inc., 164 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (the arbitrator was an employee of one party and had a financial interest in the
business of the other).
27. 164 So. 2d at 272 ("[W]e do not find that the arbitrator was motivated by corrupt
or illegal motives, but that he was susceptible, under the facts disclosed, to having his
judgment biased by his conduct toward and his association with an officer and/or
stockholder of the appellee corporation during the course of the arbitration.").
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between the arbitrator and one of the parties was cause to vacate on the
ground of passive partiality.28
Section 10(a)(3) provides that an arbitral award may be vacated
"where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced., 29 This ground
allows for objections to the way in which the arbitrator actually
conducted the hearing, such as claims that one party was denied a
fundamentally fair hearing, was denied the right to counsel, was
prejudiced by an ex parte hearing or the refusal of the arbitrator to grant a
subpoena or discovery request. 30 The high threshold requires proponents
to show that the misbehavior, in the words of one court, "so prejudiced
the rights of a party that it denies the party a fundamentally fair
hearing. 31 Such prejudice is ordinarily not found unless the aggrieved
party's right to be heard is "grossly and totally blocked. 32
Section 10(a)(4) provides that an arbitral award may be vacated
"where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made. 33 Arbitrators exceed their powers when they
issue an award on an issue not presented to them in the submission to
arbitration, or when they fail to adhere to other constraining criteria
prescribed by the parties, such as arbitration rules that the parties may
have drafted into their arbitration provisions or a choice-of-law
provision. 34 It is well-established that arbitrators do not exceed their
powers by misconstruing contracts, or making errors of law or fact. 35 As
the U.S. Supreme Court observed in United PaperworkersInternational
Union v. Misco, Inc., 36 a collective bargaining case frequently cited in
FAA cases, "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a
court is convinced he committed serious errors does not suffice to
overturn his decision. 3 7 An arbitral award is "mutual, final, and
28. See id.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006).
30. See MACNEIL, supra note 6, §§ 40.4.1, 40.4.2.
31. Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1987).
32. Cofinco, Inc. v. Bakrie & Bros., N.V., 395 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y 1975).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
34. See MACNEIL, supra note 6, § 40.5.2.
35. Id. See, e.g., Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985)
("The erroneous application of rules of law is not a ground for vacating an arbitrator's
award ... nor is the fact that an arbitrator erroneously decided the facts .. " (citations
omitted)).
36. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
37. See id.
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definite" under Section 10(a)(4) if it resolves all issues submitted to
arbitration and determines each issue fully so that38no further litigation is
necessary to finalize the obligations of the parties.
C.

The Non-statutory Grounds

The lower federal and state courts have come to recognize a variety
of grounds in addition to the statutory grounds that may be used to vacate
an arbitration award. While numerous, their deployment rarely results in
vacatur.
1.

Manifest Disregard of the Law

The manifest disregard standard is a non-statutory ground that
emanates from dicta in the Wilko v. Swan 39 case, in which the Supreme
Court said: "In unrestricted submissions, 40 the interpretations of law by
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation., 41 Wilko was
overruled on other grounds,4 2 but this particular dictum lives on, in part
because it was cited approvingly in a 1995 Supreme Court case, First
Options of Chicago v. Kaplan.43
As I have written elsewhere,44 manifest disregard can be seen as a
remnant of the old ouster doctrine, when courts believed that agreements
to arbitrate improperly ousted them of jurisdiction over matters of law.4 5
While the ouster doctrine was swept away legislatively with the FAA,
and later judicially by the Supreme Court,46 suspicion of arbitration has
38. See Conn. Tech. Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ. Props., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2d
Cir. 1996).
39. 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
40. See id. Unrestricted submissions are submissions that do not require the
arbitrator to apply relevant rules of law. See id. Restricted submissions, by contrast,
require the arbitrator to apply relevant legal rules. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
43. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (noting that
parties can seek vacatur in a narrow set of instances); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 436-437 (parties bound by arbitrator's decision not in 'manifest disregard' of the
law), overruledon other grounds, Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477.
44. See Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to
Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L. REV. 271, 303 (2007) [hereinafter
Reuben, Process Purity].
45. See Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative
DisputeResolution and Public Civil Justice,47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 977-78 (2000).
46. See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(distinguishing Wilko in holding that Securities fraud claims under the 1933 Act and
under RICO may be compelled to arbitration where the brokerage agreement includes a
mandatory arbitration clause); see also Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477 (formally overruling
Wilko).
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lingered in the minds of many courts, fueled in part by the rise of
mandatory arbitration; the prospect of judicial review for manifest
disregard has given the courts comfort in moving forward with
mandatory arbitration.4 7 As the Supreme Court said reassuringly in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, "'although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute' at
issue." 4 8 Even apart from the mandatory context, the continued existence
of the "manifest disregard" doctrine at common law preserves at least the
threat that an arbitration award can be invalidated because of the
sovereignty of the law, providing an indirect constraint on arbitral
discretion. Manifest disregard thus hangs like Damocles' sword over the
head of arbitrators.49
While nearly all courts claim the power to set aside an arbitral
award on the ground of manifest disregard, 50 few in fact do. 5' One study
of vacatur of 336 federal and state employment arbitration awards
between 1975 and 2006 found that manifest disregard was the most
common ground for seeking relief-30.4 percent of all appellate cases
studied-but was only successful in 7.1 percent of the cases.52 Another
study, of all state and federal cases in which a party sought vacatur
between January 1, 2004 and October 31, 2004, 182 cases, reached
similar results: manifest disregard was the second most frequently raised
reason cited for vacatur-28.6 percent-but succeeded in only 3.8
53
percent of the cases (two cases).

47. See Reuben, ProcessPurity, supra note 45, at 303 and sources cited therein.
48. 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232).
49. William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitration Awards, in
International Arbitration 2007, at 309, 342 (PLI Litg. & Admin. Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 10796, 2007), WL 756 PLI/Lit 309.
50. See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004) (citing

cases).
5 1. For a recent case vacating on manifest disregard grounds, see Kashner Davidson
Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68 (lst Cir. 2008) (panel manifestly disregarded law by
dismissing counterclaims as a sanction despite statutory requirement that lesser sanctions
be tried first). Interestingly, the Kashner decision came down nearly three months after
Hall Street, but the decision does not mention the Supreme Court ruling.
52. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and
Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 167, 189
(2008).
53. See Lawrence R. Mills, J.Lani Bader, Thomas J. Brewer & Peggy J. Williams,
VacatingArbitrationAwards, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 23.
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Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros, Inc. 54 is an often-cited example
of the rare case accepting a manifest disregard challenge. In that case,
counsel specifically asked the arbitrators to ignore the law in her closing
arguments.5 5 Under these circumstances, the court said it was "able to
clearly discern from the record that this is one of those cases where
manifest disregard of the law is applicable, as the arbitrators recognized
that they were told to disregard the law (which the record reflected they
knew) in a case in which the evidence to support the award was
marginal. Thus, nothing is contained in the record to refute the
suggestion that the law was disregarded. Nor does the record clearly
support the award. 5 6
Similarly, in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,57 the Second Circuit
found that the arbitrator's award was in manifest disregard of the law
because Halligan had presented overwhelming evidence of age
discrimination, that both parties had agreed upon the law governing the
claim and explained it to the arbitrator, and that the arbitrator still ruled
against the age discrimination claim in a decision unaccompanied by a
written and reasoned decision.5 8 The court remarked that "[i]n view of
the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age and the
agreement of the parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the
applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they ignored the
law or the evidence or both.",59 In the absence of an opinion explaining
54. See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
But see B.L. Harbart Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911 (1 th Cir. 2006)
("'Four facts came together in Montes and will seldom recur: Those facts are that: 1) the
party who obtained the favorable award had conceded to the arbitration panel that its
position was not supported by the law, which required a different result, and had urged
the panel not to follow the law; 2) that blatant appeal to disregard the law was explicitly
noted in the arbitration panel's award; 3) neither in the award itself nor anywhere else in
the record is there any indication that the panel disapproved or rejected the suggestion
that it rule contrary to law; and 4) the evidence to support the award is at best marginal."'
(quoting Montes, 128 F.3d at 1464 (Cames, J., concurring))).
55. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1459. Specifically, counsel stated that
[y]ou have to decide whether you're going to follow the statutes that have been
presented to you, or whether you will do or want to do or should do what is
right and just and equitable in this case. I know it's hard to have to say this and
it's probably even harder to hear it but in this case this law is not right. Know
that there is a difference between law and equity and I think, in my opinion,
that difference is crystallized in this case. The law says one thing. What equity
demands and requires and is saying is another. What is fight and fair and
proper in this? You know as arbitrators you have the ability, you're not strictly
bound by case law and precedent. You have the ability to do what is right,
what is fair and what is proper, and that's what Shearson is asking you to do.
Id.
56. Id. at 1462.
57. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 204.
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the award, the court went on to express its "firm belief that the° arbitrators
6
have manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence or both.
There are different formulations in the cases, but most courts have
concluded that parties seeking vacatur on this ground must show the
award was inconsistent with clear controlling law, the arbitrator knew
what the controlling law was, and intentionally chose to ignore or
disregard it. 61 Significantly, a mere error of law or failure to apply the
law does not rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law.62
2.

Other Non-Statutory Grounds

Manifest disregard is the primary non-statutory ground, but courts
have also recognized other non-statutory grounds, expressing a
willingness to overturn arbitration awards that violate public policy, are
arbitrary or capricious, or are simply irrational.
a.

Public Policy

Some courts have vacated awards that they found to be in violation
of public policy. 63 For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court found

that an arbitration award reinstating a state employee violated public
policy because the employee violated a criminal statute and employment
regulations set forth by its employer. 64 Similarly, a federal district court
in California vacated on public policy grounds an award that called for
the payment of certain commissions that were argued to be illegal under

60. Id.
61. For a detailed discussion of the articulation of the standard in the different
circuits, see Lindsay Biesterfield, Courts Have the Final Say: Does the Doctrine of
"Manifest Disregard" Promote Lawful Arbitral Awards or Disguise Unlawful Judicial
Review?, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 627, 632 n.56 (2006). For a general discussion, see
Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the 'Manifest Disregard' of the Law Standard: The Key
to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 117, 124-25 (1998). For
a proposal to codify manifest disregard, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest
Disregard,8 NEV. L.J. 234 (2007).
62. See, e.g., San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals
Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961); see also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm
for Commercial Arbitration:Rethinking the Relationship Between ReasonedAwards and
the JudicialStandardsFor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 465-76 (1998).
63. See, e.g., Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813,
816 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing manifest disregard and public policy exceptions as
additional to statutory grounds for judicial review under FAA); see also MACNEIL, supra
note 6, § 40.8.2; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259 (1990).
64. Connecticut v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 747 A.2d 480, 48586 (2000).
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Saudia Arabian law, U.S. Department of Defense regulations, and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.65
Such victories for the public policy ground are rare, however, as
claims that an arbitral award violates public policy are overwhelmingly
rejected. For example, the Sixth Circuit rejected a claim that enforcing a
contract with an indefinite term between a county and an engineering
66
firm was against state policy relating to contracts of public bodies.
A two-step analysis is generally used to decide whether an arbitral
award violates public policy. First, the court determines whether an
explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy can be identified; it
will not be content with speculative public interests. If so, the court then
decides if the arbitrator's award violated the public policy. In this
regard, it is important to note that an award will only be vacated on
public policy grounds when "enforcement of the award compels one of
67
the parties to take action which directly conflicts with public policy.
The reviewing court is not concerned with the correctness of the
arbitrator's decision, but rather with the lawfulness of enforcing the
award. The rationale behind the public policy challenge is that parties
can no more expect a court to approve an arbitration award that is illegal
or contrary to public policy than they can expect a court to enforce such a
contract between them.68
b.

Arbitrary and Capricious

Some courts recognize a defense to enforcement of an arbitral
award where it is contended that the award is arbitrary and capricious.
Acting in an investor-broker suit, for example, the Eleventh Circuit
found that an arbitral panel's refusal to award mandatory statutory
damages was arbitrary and capricious and did not have to be enforced.69

65. Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928 (C.D.Cal. 1984),
judgment reversed in part by, Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Marketing S.A., 811 F.2d
1265 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. L. Robert Kimball & Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 685-88
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990).
67. See Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11 th Cir. 1993).
68. Town of S. Windsor v. S. Windsor Police Union Local 1480, 770 A.2d 14, 23-24
(2001).
69. Ainsworth v. Skumick, 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992); see also B.L. Harbert
Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006) (arbitrary and
capricious, manifest disregard of the law, and public policy grounds for vacatur
supplement the FAA's statutory grounds for vacatur); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 847 F.2d 775 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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As a general matter, an award is arbitrary and capricious if it
exhibits a wholesale departure from the law,70 if a legal ground for the
arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case, if the
decision is not grounded in the contract, 1 or if the reasoning is so faulty
that no judge or group of judges could ever have conceivably made such
a ruling. The party seeking vacatur has a heavy burden of proof, being
required to refute every rational basis on which the arbitrator could
possibly have relied. 3
As with other non-statutory grounds, these claims almost always
fail, as Brown v. Rauseher Pierce Refsnes 74 illustrates. The Browns had
sued their stock broker for various allegations, including churning,
unsuitable transactions, and the failure of their broker to register in the
state of Florida.75 An arbitrator ultimately awarded them $16,000 in
damages and $4,000 in forum fees-considerably less than the $721,000
the Browns had sought.76 They sought to vacate the award as being
arbitrary and capricious, and violative of public policy because the
arbitrator did not award damages in the amount compelled by statute for
failure to register violations.77 The court rejected the claim, accepting
the arbitrator's finding that the failure to register was 7inadvertent,
rather
8
than willful, and therefore not arbitrary and capricious.

c.

Irrationality

Some courts have also indicated that arbitration awards may be
vacated if they are irrational-that is, they fail to draw their essence from
the underlying agreement. This non-statutory ground 79 is generally
derived from "the essence test" articulated in United Steelworkers v.
70. Ainsworth, 960 F.2d at 941 ("An award is arbitrary and capricious only if 'a
[legal] ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case."'
(quoting Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413
(11 th Cir. 1990))).
71. US. Postal Serv., 847 F.2d at 778; Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Cent. of Georgia
Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
72. Safeway Stores v. American Bakery and Confectionery Workers, Local 111, 390
F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968) (award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious "if the
reasoning is so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably
have made such a ruling").
73. See Ainsworth, 960 F.2d at 941; see also Cray v. Nationsbank of NC, NA, 982 F.
Supp. 850, 852 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting claim that award was arbitrary and capricious
because employee who was not found constructively discharged was nonetheless ordered
to be reinstated).
74. 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11 th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 778.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 779.
78. Id. at 782.
79. See, e.g., Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,80 another labor case that is often cited in
commercial cases. 8 ' There, the Court said that an "award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." 82 As the Fifth Circuit has further elaborated the test, "[t]o
draw its essence from the contract, an arbitrator's award must have a
basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the
letter and purpose of the agreement. The award must, in some logical
way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the contract." 83 As
another court has put it "[flor a Court to grant vacatur on the grounds that
an award is84totally irrational, there must be no proof whatever to justify
the award.,

Again, as with the other non-statutory grounds, arbitration awards
are rarely vacated as irrational.
D. Summary
Successful challenges to arbitral awards are rare. The FAA
provides for the vacatur of an award that is procured by fraud or is
otherwise corrupt, decided by a partial arbitrator, issued pursuant to a
fundamentally unfair process, or exceeds the scope of the parties'
submission to arbitration. Courts have also recognized non-statutory
grounds for vacating arbitration awards, most notably for arbitration
awards that are in manifest disregard of the law, that violate public
policy, that are arbitrary or capricious, or that are simply irrational. The
standards for both statutory and non-statutory awards are high because of
the importance of finality to the arbitration process. Substantive review
generally undermines the finality of arbitration, and courts have been
reluctant to take that step.

80. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
81. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he 'essence of the contract' analysis applies equally to judicial review under 9
U.S.C. § 10."). The comparison between labor and FAA cases is somewhat imprecise

because labor cases allege breach of contract, while FAA cases do not necessarily allege
breach of contract.
82. 363 U.S. at 597.
83. See Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 141 F. App'x 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2005);
Glover v. IBP, Inc., 334 F.3d. 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderman/Smith
Operating Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir.1990)).
84. Yonir Techs., Inc. v. Duration Sys. (1992) Ltd., 244 F. Supp. 2d 195, 210
(2002); see also Mastec N. Am., Inc. v. MSE Power Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Yonir Techs., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 209) (rejecting the irrationality

claim).
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III. HALL STREET
A.

ContractedJudicialReview

Contracted judicial review is another form of non-statutory grounds
for vacatur. In this situation, the parties are asking for awards to be set
aside if they do not follow the legal standards set forth in the arbitration
agreement, typically the law generally or the law of a specific
jurisdiction. The lower courts have badly split on whether parties have
this authority.
Courts that have endorsed contracted judicial review have used a
variety of theories, including freedom of contract 85 and the interpretation
of Section 10 as a default rule. 86 Courts have also rejected the
proposition on a variety of grounds, either because it would frustrate the
purposes of the FAA, or because the parties do not have the power to
establish federal court jurisdiction by contract.8 7
The Supreme Court decided Hall Street to resolve the split in the
lower federal courts.
B.

Facts

The facts in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., are complex. The
case involved a landlord-tenant dispute between Hall Street Associates
88
and Mattel, Inc., for a toy manufacturing site in Beaverton, Oregon.
The lease provided that Mattel would indemnify Hall Street Associates
for any costs resulting from Mattel's failure to comply with
environmental laws. 89 In 1998, the property's water well was found to

85. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001)
(endorsing substantive review if the statute clearly provides for it); Syncor Int'l Corp. v.
McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (accepting substantive review for "errors of law
or legal reasoning").
86. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995)
(permitting substantive review because Section 10 of FAA is a default provision). For
scholarly commentary arguing that Section 10 is a default provision, see Stephen J. Ware,
"Opt-In "for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263, 270 (1997).

87. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (reversing circuit panel decision endorsing contracted substantive
review) (defeats purpose of arbitration); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925
(10th Cir. 2001) (contracted judicial review frustrates purpose of FAA); Chi.
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991)
(federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract).
88. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
89. Id.
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have high levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) and other pollutants, and in a
consent decree Mattel agreed to clean up the site.90
Mattel tried to terminate the lease in 2001, but Hall Street
Associates resisted because Mattel had not yet indemnified it for the
costs of the cleanup. 9' Mattel prevailed on the termination issue in a
bench trial, and the parties tried to mediate the indemnification issue.92
When the mediation stalled, the parties agreed to arbitrate the
indemnification issue. Critically, the arbitration agreement included a
provision, approved by the district court, permitting the court to review
the arbitrator's award for legal error.93 Specifically, it provided that the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon "shall vacate, modify, or
correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's finding of facts are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous. 9 4
The arbitrator decided for Mattel, holding that the pollution
standards under the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act were laws that
dealt with "human health" rather than "environmental contamination"
requiring indemnification under the lease.95 Hall Street moved to vacate
the award as legally erroneous under Oregon law, and the district court
agreed. Upon remand, the arbitrator awarded judgment to Hall Street
Associates, finding that failure to comply with the state drinking water
standards
constituted
environmental
contamination
requiring
indemnification under the lease.96 This time Mattel appealed to the
district court, relying on a recent en banc circuit precedent, Lapine
Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,9 7 which held that judicial review
provisions in arbitration agreements were unenforceable. 98 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with Mattel that the review provision was unenforceable
and ordered the district court to
reinstate the original arbitration award in
99
manufacturer.
toy
the
favor of
The district court, however, ruled in favor of Hall Street, holding
that the arbitrator's interpretation of the lease was implausible and
therefore exceeded the scope of his authority under 9 U.S.C.
§ I0(a)(4).' 00
The Ninth Circuit again reversed, holding that
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1400-01.
Id. at 1401.
Id.
341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
Id. at 1407-08.
Id. at 1401 n.l.
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implausibility was not a ground for vacating an arbitration award, and
again ordered the original arbitration award in favor of Mattel to be
reinstated.10' The Supreme Court granted review in the case to decide
whether parties may contract for judicial review under the FAA.'I 2 After
oral arguments, the Court expanded its consideration by asking the
review
parties for supplemental briefing on whether the parties' judicial
03
agreement would be supported by grounds other than the FAA.1
C.

The Supreme Court'sDecision

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA Sections 10 and 11
"provide the FAA's exclusive statutory grounds for expedited vacatur
and modification."' 4 It considered two arguments: First, Hall Street's
common law argument that the Court's authorization of manifest
disregard in Wilko v. Swan opened the door for the expanded review
sought in this case; second, Hall Street's general freedom of contract
argument. Each will be discussed in turn.
1.

The Wilko Argument

Hall Street Associates argued that as a common law matter, the U.S.
Supreme Court itself put "the camel's nose" under the tent of contracted
review generally when it authorized manifest disregard review in Wilko
review of arbitration
v. Swan. If judges can add grounds for0 judicial
5
awards, so can parties, Hall Street argued.1
06
The Court rejected this argument as "too much for Wilko to bear."'
To begin with, the Court noted that in Wilko it had refused to hold that
arbitral awards are subject to general review for legal error-the very

101. Id. at 1401.
102. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App'x 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 2875 (2007).
103. Specifically, the Court said:
The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following
questions: (1) Does authority exist outside the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
under which a party to litigation begun without reliance on the FAA may
enforce a provision for judicial review of an arbitration award? (2) If such
authority does exist, did the parties, in agreeing to arbitrate, rely in whole or
part on that authority? (3) Has petitioner in the course of this litigation waived
any reliance on authority outside the FAA for enforcing the judicial review
provision of the parties' arbitration agreement?
Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 644 (2007).
104. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1404.
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thing that Hall Street was asking the Court to do in the case at bar. 10 7
The Court also noted that "manifest disregard" in the Wilko dictum is
devoid of specific meaning. The Court stated that it could mean a new
ground for review.10 8 But then it could also simply refer collectively to
all of the Section 10 grounds. Or, it could refer just to Sections
(10)(a)(3) or 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when
arbitrators are "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded their powers."' 0 9
But, the Court saw "no reason to accord it the significance that Hall
Street urges'--that courts may vacate arbitration awards as being in
manifest disregard of the law when the award is legally erroneous. 110
Beyond that understanding of what manifest disregard does not mean,
the Court chose to leave manifest disregard, as it has in the past,"' "as
'
we found it, without embellishment." 12
2.

The Freedom of Contract Argument

The court also rejected Hall Street's second argument, that the
judicial review provision should be enforced because Congress' intent in
passing the FAA was to enforce agreements to arbitrate as they are
drafted." 3 In effect, the argument is one of contractual freedom: the
purpose of the FAA is to enforce agreements to arbitrate as drafted,
parties should be able to draft provisions as they would like-including
with expanded judicial review.
The Court acknowledged that arbitration provides for considerable
freedom in shaping the arbitration process. However, the Court also said
that the way in which parties exercise their contractual freedom still has
to be consistent with the express terms of the FAA. The Court therefore
analyzed the text of the statute first by reference to the
text of Section 10
14
itself, and then by reference to the rest of the statute.
The Court's Section 10 analysis centered on the well-established
doctrine of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, when a statute sets
forth a series of specific items and then ends with a general term, that
107. Id. ("The United States Arbitration Act contains no provision for judicial
determination of legal issues such as is found in the English law." (citing Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427,436-437 (1953))).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11.
For the immediately preceding reference to Wilko and the concept of manifest
disregard, see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
112. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
113. Id. (The FAA is "motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to
enforce agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered." (citing Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985))).
114. Id. at 1403-06.
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general term is understood to be limited to subjects that are similar in
kind with the preceding specific terms. 1 5 In its ejusdem generic
analysis, the Court listed more than a half dozen terms in Sections 10 and
11 that the Court said stood for the proposition that "extreme arbitral
misconduct" provides a basis for vacatur or modification: "corruption,"
"fraud," "evident partiality," "misconduct," "misbehavior," "exceed[ing]
powers," "evident material miscalculation," "evident material mistake,"
and "awards upon a subject matter not submitted.... ,, 6 These specific
terms were all followed by the general term "imperfect[ions]" that go to
"a matter of form not affecting the merits." ' 17 Applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis,the Court said the general term "imperfect[ions]" would
be limited by the specific words of "extreme arbitral misconduct" and
therefore could not provide a "textual hook for expansion ' 18 to include
errors of law through contracted judicial review. "'Fraud' and mistake of
law are not cut from the same cloth," the Court said. "1 9
In so many words, the Court also used the Whole Act Rule to
further its analysis, although it did not refer to the doctrine by name.
Under the Whole Act Rule, courts interpret the meaning of a statute by
reference to other parts of the same statute. 120 In this case, the Court said
"expanding the categories would rub too much against the grain of the
Section 9 language, where provision for judicial confirmation carries no
hint of flexibility."' t21 Section 9 provides that courts "must grant" an
order confirming an arbitration award unless there is a motion to vacate,
modify, or correct under Sections 10 _1 1,122 and, in the Court's view, is
part of the legislative bargain trading off substantive judicial review in
Sections 10 and 11 in exchange for the "streamlined treatment" for
motions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards in Sections 91 1.123 Without the statutory availability of confirmation, parties would
have to negotiate a separate contract in order to receive judicial
enforcement of an arbitration award.
115.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELLIZABETH GARRETr,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

852-54 (4th Ed. 2007) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE].

116.

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404.

117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1405.

120.

For an extensive discussion of the "whole act rule," see WILLIAM N.

JR.,

PHILIP

P.

FRICKEY,

&

ELIZABETH

GARRETT,

LEGISLATION

AND

ESKRIDGE,
STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION, 263-76 (2000) (noting that the rule is universally followed in both
federal and state courts, in civil courts, as well as the courts of other common-law
countries).
121. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.

122.
123.

9 U.S.C § 9 (2006).
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
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Rather than "fighting the text," the Court said Sections 9-11 should
be read together as supporting a national policy favoring the arbitration
of disputes "with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.' 24 In other words,
the court concluded that the FAA adopts a particular understanding of
arbitration as a process that included the concept of finality, which is not
waivable by the parties. Here, the Court was clearly concerned with the
possible impact of contracted review on the finality of the arbitration
process. The Court noted that "[a]ny other reading opens the door to
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time consuming
judicial review process
and bring arbitration theory to grief in post25
arbitration process."'
There were two dissents: one by Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and the other by Justice
Stephen Breyer, writing alone. Stevens' dissent said the majority's
decision "conflicts with the primary purpose of the FAA, and ignores the
historical context in which it was passed.', 126 This dissent is discussed
more fully below.' 27 Justice Breyer issued a short dissent emphasizing
' 28
that the FAA "does not preclude enforcement of such an agreement.'
Breyer's approach was philosophically different than the majority's
approach. Where the majority sought to determine whether there was a
textual basis permitting judicial review of arbitration awards, for Justice
Breyer the proper inquiry was whether the statute precluded contracted
judicial review. 29 Since the majority had not demonstrated a statutory
intent to preclude judicial review, Breyer said he would "simply remand
the case with instructions that the Court of Appeals affirm the District
' 30
Court's judgment enforcing the arbitrator's final award.'
IV. UNDERSTANDING HALL STREET

The Court's perhaps surprising opinion can be explained on at least
three grounds:
statutory interpretation, pragmatic concerns about
opening the door to expanded judicial review, and sensitivity to the
unique characteristics and values of the arbitration process.

124.

Id.

125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 1408.

127.
128.

See infra notes 151-58, and accompanying text.
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1410 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

129.

Id. at 1410.

130.

Id.
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The Fight Over Statutory Interpretation

One way to explain the decision is that it was as much about the
court's approach to statutory interpretation as it was about the contours
of arbitration under the FAA. For the last few decades the Court has
struggled over modes of statutory interpretation. For more than a
generation between the 1950s and the 1970s, legal process theory
dominated statutory interpretation. Ascertaining statutory purpose was
the hallmark of this school, and the Court would divine statutory intent
by reference to the plain language of the statute and the legislative
history behind the statute, as well as any other extrinsic sources that
might help the court interpret and apply the purpose of the statute,
including other statutes, other significant societal events at the time of
enactment, 13or
even newspaper reports about issues relevant to the
1
legislation.
With the arrival of Justice Antonin Scalia on the Court in 1986, as
well as the arrival of certain conservative federal circuit judges-most
notably Seventh Circuit Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posnerthe Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have moved toward a
more textualist approach. Professor Eskridge has called this movement
"the New Textualism." 132 The root of the new textualism is the belief
that legislative intent and statutory meaning can only be drawn from the
text of the statute. Other tools of interpretation simply are irrelevant to
the inquiry of statutory intent.
Far removed from the legal process school judges, the New
Textualists stand in contrast even to the traditional textualists, who
would look at the text of the statute as the primary source of meaning,
but would also use other tools of statutory interpretation, most notably
legislative history, to discern statutory meaning when the statute itself is

131. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (demonstrating
breadth of resources upon which a court may draw to discern legislative intent).
132. See Michael C. Dorf,The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Dialogue, 112 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-26 (1997) (distinguishing textualism from
purposivism); William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990) (documenting the rise of the new textualism); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big
Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L.

REv. 241 (1992) (placing new textualism in context with prior theories); John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70 (2006);
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419 (2005)

(distinguishing textualism and intentionalism); John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 684-89 (1997) (describing textualist
arguments against "genuine legislative intent"); Judge Patricia Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990).
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ambiguous. 133 For the New Textualists, legislative history should not
even be consulted to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.
Rather, the plain language of the text of the statute is controlling, and if
any clarification or confirmation is required, it should come from the
structure of the statute, interpretations 34
given similar statutory provisions,
and canons of statutory interpretation.'
This battle over interpretation was born out in the Hall Street case,
with New Textualism bringing together an ideologically mixed group of
justices in the 6-3 majority: Justice David Souter, writing the opinion for
the court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin
35
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Samuel Alito.
The Court's analysis of the statute in Part III focused exclusively on
the statutory text of Section 10(a) and how it squared with the rest of the
Federal Arbitration Act, rather than using legislative history to determine
the intent or purpose of the statute. Indeed, the Court defined its task as
attempting
to square the claimed freedom of contract with the statutory
36
text.1
Since the statute did not say whether its list of grounds for vacatur
was exclusive, the statutory language was clearly ambiguous and
required additional inquiry for interpretation. Rather than consult the
legislative history or other extrinsic aids to discern the statute's purpose
or intent, Justice Souter focused instead on the structure of the statute
and canons of interpretation. With respect to structure, Souter looked at
the enforcement provisions as a whole-Sections 9-1 1-and found that
they embodied a legislative bargain that traded off judicial review of
arbitration awards in favor of streamlined judicial treatment of motions
to confirm, vacate, or correct arbitration awards. 137 In this way, the
structure of the act promotes the use of arbitration by
assuring that it
38
remains an efficient alternative to public adjudication.
Similarly, the Court also took a Whole Act approach in rejecting
Hall Street's argument that Section 10(a) is merely a default rule that can
be freely varied by the parties. The Court pointed to Section 5 of the

133. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 115, at 667-684 (New Textualism) (critiquing
arguments that legislative history should never be considered).
134.

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 115, at 623-24.

135. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1399.
136. Id. at 1404 ("But to rest this case on the general policy of treating arbitration
agreements as enforceable as such [because of the freedom of contract] would be to beg
the question, which is whether the FAA has textual features at odds with enforcing a
contract to expand judicial review following the arbitration.").
137. Id. at 1402.
138. Id. at 1405. For an argument that the Hall Street result is inefficient, see David
K. Kessler, Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest for Efficiency in Hall Street
Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,__ FLA. ST. Bus. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009).
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FAA as an example of a default rule in that statute. 3 9 That provision
deals with arbitral selection and provides that
[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator... such method shall be followed; but if no
method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party
thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method.... then upon
application of either party to the
140 controversy, the court shall
designate and appoint an arbitrator.
Finally, Justice Souter also used the doctrine of ejusdem generis to
support his textual argument.' 4' As noted above, this doctrine is a timehonored canon of statutory interpretation holding that general words
followed by specific words should be limited to the character of the
specific words. 142 Here, Justice Souter identified more than a half dozen
words in both Section 10 and Section 11, the modification provision, to
suggest that the chief concerns of the provisions were "extreme arbitral
[mis]conduct."' 143 Hall Street was seeking review for mistakes of law,
which 44
Justice Souter said simply was not "cut from the same cloth" as
fraud. 1

From a statutory interpretation perspective, it is particularly telling
that the majority opinion does not even purport to determine statutory
purpose or intent; rather, it simply seeks to determine whether the words
of the statute permit the construction sought by Hall Street Associates.
Nor does the opinion mention legislative history until a footnote to its
final words, and even then only in support of Justice Souter's conclusion
that "whatever the consequence of our holding,
the statutory text gives us
145
no business to expand the statutory grounds."'
Footnote 7 then describes how "[t]he history of the FAA is
consistent with our conclusion."' 146 In this regard, the majority147
excluding Justice Scalia, who refused to join this part of the opinion looked at the New York statute upon which the FAA was modeled,
noting that its limited grounds for vacatur and modification are "virtually
identical" to those in the FAA. 148 The Court also looked at a brief
tendered to the House and Senate Subcommittees of the Committees on
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
Id.
Id.at 1404.
See supra notes 115-19, and accompanying text.
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1406.
Id. at 1406 n.7.
Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1406 n.7.
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the Judiciary by a principal drafter of the statute, Julius Henry Cohen; the
brief stated that awards may be vacated or modified "then and then only"
if they meet the standards set forth in Sections 10 or 11.149 Cohen also
testified that the New York law was different than the Illinois law then in
effect, "which required an arbitrator, at the request of either party, to
submit any question
of law arising during arbitration to judicial
150
determination.'
The dissent by Justices Stevens and Kennedy presents a stark
contrast in modes of statutory interpretation, reflecting more of a legal
process perspective.
It heavily emphasized congressional intent,
purpose, and history. Justice Stevens said the "core purpose" of the FAA
was "to abrogate the general common-law rule against specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements" and "to ensur[e] that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. '15 1 For
Justice Stevens, purpose trumps text, 152 and the Court's refusal to enforce
"perfectly reasonable judicial review provisions in arbitration agreements
153
fairly negotiated by the parties and approved by the district court
"defeats the primary purpose of the statute."' 154 Justice Stevens said the
purpose of effectuating party agreements to arbitrate also trumps the
Court's reliance on the "wooden application of the 'old rule of ejusdem
generis.' ' 155 Stevens concluded his opinion by echoing Hall Street
Associates' freedom of contract argument, saying "[a] decision 'not to
regulate' the terms of an agreement that does not even arguably offend
any public policy whatsoever,
'is adequately justified by a presumption
156
in favor of freedom.'
Finally, it is worth noting that Stevens also relies on other extrinsic
' 157
tools to support his conclusion. He refers to "the historical context
and later cites two law review articles as supporting his conclusion that
arbitration awards were subject to "thorough and broad judicial
review."'' 5 8 Again, New Textualism would eschew references to such
extrinsic interpretive aids.
In sum, then, statutory interpretation may provide one reason to
explain the Court's decision in Hall Street. Justices frustrated by the
149.

150.
151.
152.
Court's
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1409 (The "purpose [of the FAA] also provides a sufficient response to the
reliance on statutory text.").
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
Id. at 1409-10.
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1409 n.3.
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indeterminacy of intent and purpose in the FAA context may simply
have thought textualism was the best approach.
However, such
formalism often masks other concerns, and it may well be that the
decision is better explained by pragmatic concerns that the Court might
have had with respect to contracted judicial review.
B.

PragmaticConsiderations

The Court's decision can also be explained by pragmatic
concerns-in particular the potential reach of an unbridled freedom of
contract argument. On its terms alone, the freedom of contract bows to
no inherent limitations, and Hall Street Associates was essentially
arguing that the FAA should be interpreted to endorse party contracting
power over all aspects of arbitration, including judicial review.
But adopting such an approach would open the door to difficult
questions that would consume much judicial time and resources as the
courts decided just how much freedom parties might have in prescribing
the rules that would be applied by federal courts reviewing arbitration
awards. Would parties, for example, be able to specify the legal rules
that a reviewing court would be required to use-perhaps even requiring
the court to apply a standard for review that is inconsistent with present
law? 159 Could courts be precluded from applying a particular rule of law
if that is what the parties wanted and to which they agreed? Would the
courts have to apply or construe a substantive rule that the parties had
drafted into their agreement, perhaps one that was unique in that it had
not been adopted by any federal court, or perhaps by the relevant circuit?
What if the rule directly
contradicts the circuit's law or U.S. Supreme
160
precedent?
Court
Reliance on a broad freedom of contract invites rather than resolves
such questions, and would lead to an inefficient use of the limited
resources of the courts. Indeed, from the perspective of the courts, it is
hard to imagine a move more detrimental to judicial efficiency than
permitting expanded judicial review. The introduction of substantive
judicial review of arbitration awards by contract opens the courthouse
doors to an entire class of cases-appeals of arbitration awards-not
currently eligible for consideration by the federal courts, and a relatively
159. Professor Rau has suggested, for example, that Prima Paint is a default rule that
parties may freely contract around. See Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the
ArbitrationAct, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 236 (1997).
160. For discussion of a creative ADR structure that began with arbitration but was
followed by a negotiation that resulted in a contractual agreement to establish a private
system of law, see Robert H. Mnookin & Jonathan D. Greenberg, Lessons of the IBMFujitsu Arbitration:How Disputants Can Work Together to Solve Deeper Conflicts, Disp.
RESOL. MAG.,

Spring 1998, at 16.
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large class at that. What is more, those doors are not opened once but
twice, at the trial level and then at the appellate level reviewing those
trial level decisions. While records are not kept on the number of
arbitrations conducted every year, and providers jealously guard such
information as proprietary, it seems reasonable to assume the total
number of cases arbitrated annually in the United States is at least in the
hundreds of thousands, if only because of the proliferation of mandatory
arbitration provisions in standard form contracts. This would put
considerably more pressure on the dockets of the current federal bench
and perhaps even require its expansion to accommodate the additional
workload.
Since traditional notions of judicial prudence militate against
opening the door to such substantive and procedural problems, 161 it is not
surprising for the Court to take a narrower approach to the freedom of
contract, endorsing party freedom to contract in ways consistent with the
language of the statute. Such an approach respects party autonomy to
contract on a wide variety of issues-who the arbitrator is, the way the
arbitrator is chosen, the standards for decision, what issues are
arbitrable 62-while at the same time avoids embroiling the courts in
questions that are not necessary to resolve in order to give meaning and
effect to the statute as drafted.
C.

1 63
Process Characteristicsand Values

A third explanation for the Court's seemingly odd result is that it
was taking into account the unique process characteristics and values of
the arbitration process, as historically understood under the Federal
Arbitration Act. The most significant of these virtues for purposes of

161. For a discussion of prudentialism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 59-73 (1982) (describing prudential argument as one of
six categories of approaches); see also Damien Schiff, Nothing New Under the Sun: The
Minimalism of Chief Justice Roberts and the Supreme Court's Recent Environmental
Law Jurisprudence, 15 Mo. ENVTL. L & POL'Y REV. 1, 14-26 (2007). See generally
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR

OF POLITICS 69-70, 111-98 (1962) (regarding the "Passive Virtues" as related to
prudentialism).
162. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
163. By process characteristic and value theory, I am referring to my proposal for
distinguishing between dispute resolution processes according to several different
dimensions of process characteristics and values: party autonomy, level of formality,
efficiency, the decision maker, the standard for decision, the form of the decision, the
enforceability of the decision, finality, privacy, and civility. According to the theory,
these distinctions should be considered when regulating a dispute resolution process,
either formally through legislation, administrative or judicial rules or informally through
industry standards. See Reuben, Process Purity, supra note 44, at 277-84.
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this case are the distinct but interrelated characteristics of finality and
efficiency.
1.

Finality and Efficiency

Finality is a defining difference between commercial arbitration
under the FAA and public adjudication, a structural characteristic that
distinguishes arbitration from other dispute resolution processes. Unlike
public adjudication, which provides appellate review to assure the trial
judge's proper and accurate application of the law to the facts, the
decisions of arbitrators are generally not subject to substantive review for
correctness or accuracy. Indeed, the notion of substantive "correctness"
or "accuracy" historically has had little place in arbitration precisely
because arbitration calls for the exercise of worldly judgment that is
informed by a variety of considerations that may not lend themselves to
an objective notion of correctness or accuracy, such as knowledge of
economic considerations in the securities industry or professional
standards and practices in the construction industry. Federal and state
courts alike have been consistent in their support of the finality of
arbitration, even refusing to disturb arbitration awards that are clearly
erroneous on their face.64
Finality helps to achieve efficiency in arbitration, another process
characteristic and value, and an important goal for many choosing
arbitration as a means to resolve their disputes. The potential for
efficiency has been an important virtue of commercial arbitration
throughout its Anglo-American history. Arbitration became formalized
in the commercial context with the rise of the craftsmen's gilds and65
Court Merchant fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
Efficiency was particularly important in these contexts because of the
need of parties to get their dispute resolved and move on with their lives.
The Court Merchant fairs, for example, involved itinerant merchants who
traveled from town fair to town fair peddling their wares. 166 Speed of
resolution and finality of result were particularly important to these
traveling merchants because they were often in a community only for a
short period of time.
Today, the potential efficiency advantages of speedy resolution and
lower costs continue to be among the more compelling reasons parties

164. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001);
Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
165. See Earl S. Wolaver, The HistoricalBackground of Commercial Arbitration, 83
U. PA. L. REV. 132, 133-34 (1934).

166. See generally JULIUS
71-83 (1918).

HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
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have for choosing arbitration. Arbitration can be faster and cheaper than
the courts, in part because it averts the long waiting time for a trial in
some jurisdictions, the large legal and expert witness fees generated by
extensive pre-trial discovery and long, complex trials, and the delay to
the implementation of an adjudicatory decision that can be caused by
appeals. 167
The Supreme Court's decision explicitly preserves these qualities of
arbitration. In a crucial part of the opinion Souter says limited review is
"needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.' ' 68 While the language is a bit odd, it is clear that Souter is
considering finality, and that he sees the relationship between finality
and efficiency. "Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal
and evidentiary appeals that can 'rende[r] informal arbitration merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review
process,' 169and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration
process."
Thus, under a process characteristics and values approach, the
Court's decision simply reflects a decision to preserve, as much as
possible, FAA arbitration's core characteristics and values of finality and
efficiency as understood by the enacting Congress.
2.

Reversing Field?

The Court's holding on this point clearly privileges finality over
party autonomy, which is also an arbitration process virtue. This seems
at odds with an earlier case in which the Court was confronted with the
tension between efficiency and autonomy, and came down on the side of
autonomy. In that case, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 7 the action
arose from a brokerage agreement that included an arbitration clause and
171
involved both federal securities claims and related state law claims.
The investor had filed in federal district court, but the broker moved to
sever the state law claims so that they could be arbitrated pursuant to the
agreement. 7 2 (The broker assumed the federal claims were not
arbitrable under the law at the time.) 173 The Supreme Court held that the
state claims were arbitrable, even though it meant the case would be
167.

See generally Riskin, supra note 2, at 652-54.

168.
169.
170.

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
Id.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).

171.

Id. at 214-15.

172. Id.
173. Id. at 215. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the court had held that a
predispute agreement to arbitrate certain claims under the Securities Act of 1933 was
unenforceable. See id. at 216 n. 1.
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heard in both arbitration (on the state claims) and in federal court (on the
federal claims). 174 In so holding, the court said: "The legislative history
of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure
the judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate. We
therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of175
the Arbitration
Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims."'
Some have suggested Hall Street is a reversal of the Court's
position in Byrd. 176 However, such an understanding ignores the real
differences between finality and efficiency as process values. Finality is
about the degree to which a decision is reviewable, while efficiency is
about whether the process saves the parties and the system time, money,
and other resources. As process values, they are related but distinct.
Finality fosters efficiency, but it is not the same as efficiency.
Under this view, to equate Byrd with Hall Street is to mix apples
and oranges. Byrd said institutional efficiency is not enough to trump
party autonomy, while Hall Street said that finality is enough to trump
party autonomy. This interpretation makes perfect sense when you
consider that Congress had a particular form of arbitration in mind when
it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, one that was built upon
the twin pillars of the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the
finality of arbitral awards.
According to Professor Schmitz, Congress was drafting against the
backdrop of the common law history of arbitration in England and the
United States. 177 Common law courts had an ambivalent relationship
with arbitration, recognizing on the one hand arbitration's potential to
enhance party autonomy, while on the other its capacity to undermine
their own power as courts of law. 7 8 As a result, courts were reluctant to
enforce agreements to arbitrate, but were willing to enforce arbitral
awards as final and binding. 79 This general posture, however, did not
prevent some courts from meddling with arbitration agreements when
they so desired, using such techniques as finding the award "not
180
sufficiently definite" or "complete and mutual" enough to be enforced.
They were also willing to set aside arbitration awards on grounds of

174.

Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 216-17.

175. Id.at 219.
176. See Kessler, supra note 138.
177. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's
Finality Through FunctionalAnalysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123 (2002). Significantly, none of
this background was available to the court since it used a New Textualist approach to
analyzing the statute. See supra notes 132-58, and accompanying text.
178. Schmitz, 37 GA. L. REv. at 139-40.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 141.
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contract interpretation or public policy,
as well as for legal errors, if the
181
arbitration agreement so provided.
Schmitz demonstrates that the drafters of the U.S. Arbitration Act,
and its virtually identical predecessor, the New York Arbitration Law,
sought to clear up this confusion in the common law on judicial review
by setting up a system of limited, non-substantive review: the
streamlined approach to enforcement in Sections 9 and 10.82 As
described above, the grounds in Section 10 were limited to procedural
irregularity, and courts in Section 9 were required to confirm awards
when asked by a party unless the grounds for vacatur in Section 10 were
satisfied. "Drafters of the legislation aimed to preserve the efficiency
and simplicity of arbitration, and to protect its self-contained process
based on equity, norms, and custom," Schmitz explains.1 83 Indeed, to
maintain the distinction between arbitration and public adjudication, the
drafters also rejected the English rule permitting review of errors of law
and deliberately established a model of arbitration as a process whose
results were final and binding. 184 Thus, the drafters "sought to ensure the
independence of arbitration from the judiciary by crafting legislation that
would require strict enforcement of not only arbitration agreements, but
' 85
also awards."'
Thus, it is not surprising for the Hall Street Court to distinguish
Byrd by saying Byrd was "merely trying to explain that the inefficiency
and difficulty of conducting simultaneous arbitration and federal-court
186
litigation was not a good enough reason to defer the arbitration."'
Since the purpose of the FAA was to enforce agreements to arbitrate,
generalized claims of efficiency could not possibly trump enforceability
in Byrd. However, since the purpose of the act was also to implement a
model of arbitration that was characterized by finality, and thus
efficiency, the expanded review argument must fail in Hall Street
because expanded review would undermine the finality and efficiency of
the arbitration process itself. Put another way, the personal autonomy
argument prevailed in Byrd because it was set against a mere generalized
claim of efficiency, while the argument failed in Hall Street because it
would have caused a change in the structure of the FAA arbitration
process itself that would make the process less efficient. It is this
practical dynamic that would "bring arbitration theory to grief in post-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 134, 143.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 144.
Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).
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arbitration process, ' ' 187 and which the Court properly rejected from a
process characteristics and values perspective.
IV.

VACATUR AFTER HALL

STREET

The Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street will impact both the
statutory and non-statutory grounds for vacatur described in Part II of
this Article. 188 With regard to statutory grounds, Hall Street can be
expected to focus practitioners' attention on Section 10(a)(4) as a
possible way around Hall Street to provide substantive judicial review
for parties who want to contract for it. Courts should resist this
temptation, however, because this approach would permit parties to
accomplish indirectly what Hall Street forbids them to accomplish
directly, as discussed more fully below. For non-statutory grounds, the
opinion should effectively eliminate all but the public policy ground, in
my view, also discussed in more detail below.
A.

Statutory Grounds

The FAA's statutory grounds do not provide for substantive judicial
review of arbitration awards, and Hall Street limits the grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards to those specifically enumerated in
the statute. Still, litigants who lose in arbitration can reasonably be
expected to want to have adverse decisions set aside, and to focus their
attention on Section
10(a)(4) of the FAA as an attempt to avoid the Hall
1 89
Street decision.'
1.

The Expansion of Section 10(a)(4)

In relevant part, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA allows for the vacatur
of awards "where arbitrators exceed their powers . . .," and leaves parties
seeking to use it to obtain judicial review with at least two options. 190
Under the first option, parties may argue that an implied condition of the
arbitral award is that it be consistent with the law of the relevant
jurisdiction. Or, the parties can be more proactive, and draft substantive
review provisions into their arbitration clauses. For example, they may
insert clauses into arbitration provisions that preclude an arbitrator from
making an error of law, or an error of fact, or deciding the case in a way
187.

Id. at 1405.

188. See supra notes 21-84.
189. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). See Carroll Neesemann, Helping the Supreme Court
Help Arbitration: Narrowing the Grounds for Review of Awards in Hall Street and
Beyond, 1 N.Y. Disp. RESOL. L. 13, 14 (Fall 2008), for an article urging practitioners to
take this approach.
190. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
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that reflects the other major non-statutory grounds (public policy,
arbitrary and capriciousness, and irrationality). 19' Such a provision
would provide a firm basis to challenge an award that was legally
erroneous, based on factual error, etc., as exceeding the power of the
arbitrator.
The parties in Wood v. Penntex Resources,'92 a post-Hall Street
case, included just such a provision. The case involved a corporate
takeover contract that included a provision in its arbitration clause
prohibiting "clearly erroneous findings of fact."' 193 The losing party in
the arbitration sought to have the award vacated on the ground that it
exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's powers under Section
10(a)(4)
194
because the award included two alleged errors of fact-finding.
Should such a claim be permitted after Hall Street? There are
compelling arguments going both ways.
On the one hand, party autonomy remains a coveted value of the
arbitration process and dispute resolution in general, and parties have
long been able to define the scope of the arbitrator's authority by
determining which issues may be arbitrated under the agreement. In this
regard, exceeding-powers review is simply another way in which the
arbitrator's power is defined.1 95 Under this view, an award based on
clearly erroneous findings of fact should permit the arbitration loser to
bring the claim, as in Wood v. Penntex Resources, and to have the award
set aside. Such an award would exceed the scope of the arbitrator's
authority under Section 10(a)(4).
Conversely, one could also argue that such an approach would
improperly circumvent the central holding of Hall Street: that the
grounds for the substantive judicial review of an arbitration award are
limited to those specifically enumerated in the act. This is the view that
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas actually took in

191. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules,
Mandatory Rules, and JudicialReview ofArbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 419,
431-33 (2003), for a suggestion to this effect.
192. Civil Action No. H-06-2198, 2008 WL 2609319 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2008).
193. Id. at *2 (with the full stockholder's purchase agreement stating that "The
arbitrators' decision will be considered as a final and binding resolution of the
disagreement, will not be subject to appeal and may be entered as an Order in any court
of competent jurisdiction in the United States; provided that this Agreement confers no
power or authority upon the arbitrators to render any decision that is based on clearly
erroneous findings of fact, that manifestly disregards the law, or exceeds the powers of
the arbitrator, and no such decision will be eligible for confirmation.").
194. See id. at *5.
195. See Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 469 (2008)
(arguing that the Hall Street Court improperly constrained personal freedom in
arbitration).
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Wood v. Penntex Resources. Refusing to vacate the arbitration award,
the court stated:
Under the narrow reading of Hall Street Wood urges, parties could
expand the statutory grounds for vacatur to include other errors or
defects simply by defining an arbitrator's power as not including the
power to make awards based on those errors or defects. The
reviewing court would then have to review the award to determine if
it was based on any of those errors or defects, and if so vacate the
award. [This] would result in precisely the 'full bore le6gal and
evidentiary appeals' that the Court held the FAA precluded.2
In my view, the Wood court properly held that parties should not be
able to accomplish indirectly what Hall Street prohibits them from
accomplishing directly. The fundamental principle behind Hall Street is
a rule of judicial non-intervention-that courts are not to meddle with
arbitration awards-except under the limited circumstances that
Congress has specified. A process characteristics and values perspective
helps to explain the appropriateness of the Wood court's approach.
2.

A Process Values and Characteristics Perspective

In a previous article, I suggested that the essential process
characteristics and values of a dispute resolution process could be
defined along several dimensions: party autonomy, level of formality,
efficiency, the decision maker, the standard for decision, the form of the
decision, the enforceability of the decision, finality, privacy, and
civility. 197 Several of these dimensions would be adversely affected with

respect to arbitration under the FAA if the courts permit Section 10(a)(4)
to be used as a vehicle for expanded substantive review of arbitration
awards.
a.

Efficiency

As experience in the public adjudication system itself suggests, a
losing litigant in adjudication with an opportunity to appeal will often
take advantage of the opportunity to appeal. 198 If courts permit Section
196. Id. at*8.
197. See Reuben, Process Purity,supra note 44.
198. Empirical researchers looking at federal courts, for example, have found a
significant level of appeals, although there is significant variation in the assessment of the
federal rate depending upon the data set and other research parameters. Comell Law
School empiricist Theodore Eisenberg found a federal appeal rate of 10.9% for all federal
civil cases filed between 1987 and 1996. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates in Tried and
Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 659, 663, 664 tbl.1 (2004). Other researchers have found lower rates. See, e.g.,
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10(a)(4) to be used as a vehicle for expanding substantive judicial
review, then one can only assume that, at the minimum, sophisticated
users with bargaining power can reasonably be expected to include such
excess-power provisions just to preserve the option of appealing an
adverse decision; indeed, this may well be the real motivation behind
party interest in contracted judicial review to begin with.' 99
It is one thing for parties to choose to waive their interest in the
efficiency of arbitration; but, the implications for the courts are quite
significant in terms of the potential, increased workload that would result
from the broad use of substantive review provisions. To be sure, one can
certainly argue that there would not be any more cases, that the cases
currently in the system as non-statutory grounds cases would simply be
recharacterized as Section 10(a)(4) cases. But one may just as easily
speculate-more plausibly in my view-that even just a few successful
cases could give hope to many disgruntled litigants, potentially
increasing the number of cases that the courts would have to considerpossibly at both the trial and appellate levels. What is not speculative,
however, is that refusing to permit the expanded use of Section 10(a)(4)
would remove those claims from the system entirely. Thus, expanded
substantive review through Section 10(a)(4) would likely be inefficient
for the courts.
b.

Standard for Decision

Arbitrators who are directed to follow the law in the arbitration
submission will have little reason to change their practices if enhanced
substantive review is permitted through an expanded Section 10(a)(4).
However, arbitrators who are not directed to follow the law, presumably
the more common situation,2 °0 will have an incentive to further legalize
their arbitral decision making, to the detriment of the process. 20 '
Carol Krafka, Joe S. Cecil, & Patricia Lombard, Stalking the Increase in the Rate of
Federal Civil Appeals, 18 JUST. Sys. J. 233, 244 (1996) ("The relationship between

appeals and district court terminations [has remained] steady through the years, with
approximately 8.6 appeals filed for every 100 district terminations."). Others have said it
is higher, "approximately 13 percent," Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513, 556-57 (2006), while others place it in the 10.3 percent to 18.6

percent range, when high-appeal cases, such as prisoner and federal civil rights appeals,
are factored into the analysis. See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM.

L. REv. 1600, 1609 n.38 (2000). One can reasonably expect results that are not too
dissimilar for state courts.
199. It is unclear just how many parties in fact seek to contract for judicial review.
The anecdotal evidence is that the practice is rare, although it is an empirical question
worth pursuing. Still, I am skeptical given that finality is one of the reasons why parties
might seek to choose arbitration to resolve a dispute.

200. Whether there are more arbitration clauses with provisions directing the
arbitrator to follow the law than not is an empirical question upon which I have seen no
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Arbitrators who do not base their decisions on legal standards today
have the capacity and comfort of doing so precisely because there is no
appellate body to "second-guess" their decisions. In an environment of
substantive judicial review through Section 10(a)(4), it is reasonable to
expect this to change quite dramatically. Arbitrators can be expected to
rely less on equity, justice, industry standards, or other norms that could
be interpreted by a reviewing court as legally or factually erroneous,
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of public policy, or irrational. Few
neutrals like to be reversed, a dynamic that is only exacerbated by the
fact that arbitration is a system that is largely regulated by the free
market, where reversal and affirmation rates can easily be exploited in
the competition for market share.2 °2 While only time will tell, one can
reasonably foresee arbitral decision making becoming less adaptive to
the situation and more closely tethered to pre-existing legal norms in
such an environment.
The institutionalization of this type of formalization would be
devastating to FAA arbitration as we know it. Along with finality, the
flexibility of decision making and the ability of the arbitrators to ground
their rulings in norms other than law go to the heart of arbitration as a
dispute resolution process and its distinction from public adjudication. It
is this flexibility that allows arbitrators to season their judgment with
their experience, their knowledge of the field, and practical common
sense. Without this kind of flexibility, you simply do not have
to
arbitration-certainly not the concept of arbitration that led 2Congress
03
endorse arbitration so strongly in the Federal Arbitration Act.
research. Given that the standard form arbitration clauses provided by the American
Arbitration Association and JAMS do not include judicial review provisions, I would
assume that the majority of arbitration clauses do not include such provisions. See
American Arbitration Association, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses-A Practical
Guide (2007); JAMS, JAMS Guide to Dispute Resolution Clauses for Commercial
Contracts (2006), http://www.jamsadr.com/adrtips/clauses.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
201. For a fuller articulation of concerns about the legalization of arbitration, see
Thomas Stipanowich, Arbitration: The 'New Litigation', Nov. 7, 2008, http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1297526. For concerns about a similar phenomenon in mediation, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture:A Tale of Innovation Coopted or 'The Law ofADR', 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
202. There has been surprisingly little research on competition within the ADR
industry, but it certainly exists. See, e.g., ADR Brief, The AAA 's Not-So-Happy New
Year, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 19 (Feb. 2006) (describing increased
competition in the ADR provider field); David A. Hoffman & Lamont E. Stallworth,
Leveling the PlayingFieldfor Workplace Neutrals: A Proposalfor Achieving Racial and
Ethnic Diversity, 63-APR Disp. RESOL. J. 37, 45 (2008) (noting how general statistics on
the use of neutrals are not kept); Anthony M. Aarons, Packaging ADR: The Industry Is
Still Searching for a Way to Make Money, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 26 (detailing
competition in the ADR industry).
203. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (1926) ("There is no opportunity for vacation upon a
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Form of Decision

Enhanced substantive judicial review through Section 10(a)(4) may
also change the form of arbitral decisions. Courts will need to have
written and reasoned decisions to review, and arbitrators will be obliged
to provide them. This will come at a financial cost to the parties, who
will have to pay for the arbitrator's time drafting the opinion. One may
reasonably expect that court review will also result in delay in at least
some cases, perhaps many, as arbitrators labor more defensively to
produce written and reasoned awards that will withstand the scrutiny of a
reviewing court. Again, this dynamic would defeat the efficiency goals
of the arbitration process, and the parties' interest in expeditious dispute
resolution.
d.

Formality

Raising the level of judicial review through Section 10(a)(4) can
also be expected to raise the level of formality of arbitration hearings.
Legal counsels of course must represent their arbitration clients as
diligently and zealously as their clients in public adjudication.20 4 In an
environment of enhanced substantive judicial review through Section
10(a)(4), one can reasonably anticipate lawyers being compelled to
prepare the case for review during the arbitration proceeding itself just as
they do during a trial proceeding. This means not only raising more
objections, but also introducing more defensive evidence aimed at
bolstering one's own prospects upon appeal or blunting the force of the
other party's appeal.
e.

Privacy

Finally, the privacy of arbitration would be severely compromised
by a regime in which substantive review of arbitration awards was
available through Section 10(a)(4). As noted above, substantive judicial
review would require a record that a court can review, and a federal
district court would generally be required to issue a written and reasoned
opinion in its review of the award.20 5 That opinion would necessarily
include information that the parties might have chosen arbitration to
technical ground. The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators
unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it
ought not to be enforced.").
204. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 & 1.3 (2007) (calling for
"competent" and "diligent" representation); see also John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the
Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L.
REv. 207, 219-24 (2008), for a succinct discussion on zealous representation.
205. See FED. R. App. P. 10 (requirement of a record).
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avoid making public, such as the identities of the parties, the facts of the
dispute, the amount in controversy, and the arguments made by the
parties. An opinion designated for publication could be reported by
newspapers, broadcasted over the airways, and made available on
commercial reporting services, such as Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis.
Moreover, any documents received by the trial court would be freely
available as public records.2 °6 While one or both of the parties could
seek an order sealing the proceedings, the movant bears a high burden of
proof and may not succeed.20 7
3.

Substantive Arbitral Review: Appellate Arbitration

But what if the parties want to contract for some kind of substantive
review? In my view, substantive review is still possible under Hall
Street-although by arbitrators, not by courts. That is to say, what Hall
Street said the FAA prohibits is the parties contracting for public
substantive judicial review in a public court because error of law is not a
ground for vacating an arbitral award. However, the Hall Street decision
does not preclude the parties from engaging in private substantive review
for which major
by another arbitrator or arbitral panel, a 20possibility
8
arbitration provider rules currently provide.
Parties may have legitimate reasons for desiring substantive judicial
review of an arbitration award, such as when the economic or other
stakes are particularly high, or when they want the substantive law
applied but do not want the delay that comes with public courts. The
ability to tailor the arbitration process to the particular needs of the
parties is one of the strengths of the process, and having opted out of the
public system of law by choosing arbitration, the parties may still tailor
the process to their needs by including a provision calling for substantive
review by a private arbitrator. Such review fosters important freedom of
contract and personal autonomy values in arbitration, and parties should
206. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)
(recognizing a long-standing tradition of allowing the public "to inspect and copy public
records and documents, including judicial records and documents").
207. See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(c) (authorizing the issuance of protective orders).
Because of the presumption favoring public access to judicial proceedings, moving
parties bear the burden of proof, which often requires a showing of good cause and
specific harms that will be incurred by one or more of the parties if the information is
disclosed. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2002) (parties
secrecy agreement does not warrant maintaining documents under seal); United States v.
Amodeo (Amodeo 1), 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995) (establishing a presumption of
access).
208. See, for example, JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, which may be
found on its web site at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/optional.asp (last visited on Jan.
11,2009).
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be able to trade off efficiency for substantive review at this level if they
so desire.
Arbitral review would be similar to judicial review in the public
system. Rather than being appeals in the public law sense of being
limited to questions of law, however, such private arbitral appeals are
more in the nature of a second round of arbitration, where finding of
facts could be subject to review in addition to the arbitrator's legal
determinations. Since private arbitral review would simply be a second
arbitration, the award by the reviewing arbitrator or arbitral panel should
be eligible for confirmation by the courts because the confirmation
provision of the FAA does not distinguish between trial and appellate
levels of arbitral decision making.2 °9
Arbitral review would not adversely affect the arbitration process to
the same degree as public judicial review. Private review does not
implicate society's efficiency interests in the courts, and the proper
allocation of judicial resources, because courts (and the public) are not
required to bear the burden of this party choice. The parties alone pay
those costs. Moreover, unlike a reviewing court, a reviewing arbitral
panel would not need to review the case for compliance with the legal
rules but could assess the validity of the ruling below on whatever
standards that the arbitrator used to decide the case, such as industry
standards, customs, or practices. While private arbitral review may
result in more written and reasoned opinions, adding to formality, this
additional level of formalization, by itself, is hardly a cause for alarm,
and indeed, some parties already exercise this design option. Parties
would not necessarily be more inclined to choose lawyers as arbitrators
because the basis of decision would not be legal unless the parties
directed the arbitrator to apply legal standards. Finally, arbitral review
would not implicate the privacy concerns that public judicial review
implicates because the arbitral reviews would be private proceedings
rather than public hearings.
B.

Non-Statutory Grounds

The foregoing discussion addressed only how the statutory grounds
will be more important in a post-Hall Street world. By holding that the
statutory grounds are "exclusive,, 210 the Supreme Court appears to have
precluded the lower courts from considering arguments that an arbitral
award may be vacated on non-statutory grounds. The analysis is more
finely grained, however.

209. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
210.

Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
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Arbitrary and Capricious, Irrationality Review

As noted above, Hall Street rests on the principle that courts
generally may not meddle with arbitration awards. Arbitration is a final
process, and courts may not second guess arbitral awards. But what
about awards that are truly bizarre? The common law grounds of
arbitrary and capricious and irrationality review are aimed at such
awards. Do they survive Hall Street?
In my view, the answer is no. These review standards are not
statutory grounds under Section 10(a) and under Hall Street, and thus, it
is unnecessary and inappropriate for courts to hear such claims. In
choosing arbitration, parties make a calculated choice: that the benefits
of the process outweigh the virtues of the public litigation process,
virtues that include substantive review for arbitrariness and
capriciousness and rationality in the form of judicial commitments to the
rule of law.211 With arbitration, the arbitrator's discretion is generally
not constrained by rule of law norms. Rather, the arbitrator is afforded
great latitude to reach a decision based upon the facts presented without
second-guessing by the courts. However, what may seem perfectly
rational to an arbitrator and a prevailing party may seem irrational to a
losing party. As the Supreme Court has consistently repeated, as long as
the decision draws its essence from the contract, its substantive
legitimacy cannot be questioned by a court.212 For cases in which the
decision is not drawn from the essence of the contract, Section 10(a)(4)
provides an adequate remedy-not because the awards are arbitrary and
capricious or are irrational, but because they exceed the scope of the
arbitrator's authority since the award is not drawn from the essence of
the contract that the arbitrator has been authorized to interpret by the
parties. As such, arbitrary and capricious review and irrationality review
are unnecessary components of the architecture of arbitration, and should
be shed as inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Hall Street.
2.

Public Policy Review

The public policy exception presents a closer call than the arbitrary
and capricious and irrationality non-statutory grounds. Under the precise
language of the Hall Street opinion, the public policy exception should
no longer be available as a basis for vacating an arbitration award. 2 13 It

211. See RISKIN, supra note 2, at 651-53.
212. United Steelworkers of America v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
213. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
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is not a statutory ground, and Hall Street limits the universe of valid
grounds for vacatur to the statutory grounds. A strict reading of this
produces an anomalous result in the public policy context, however.
Consider for example the case of Northrop Corp. v. Triad Financial
Establishment,214 in which an arbitration award itself compels a party to
perform an illegal act. In that case, a federal district court in California
used the public policy ground to vacate an arbitration award that called
for the payment of certain commissions that were illegal under Saudi
Arabian law, U.S. Department of Defense regulations, and the federal
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.21 5 If the Supreme Court decision in Hall
Street is taken seriously, the award should not be set aside, despite the
fact that it forces the parties to subject themselves to criminal liability if
they comply with the arbitrator's order.
Such a result would frustrate public policy because the result is
inconsistent with the contractual foundations of arbitration itself in that
contract law does not permit the enforcement of contracts to perform
illegal acts.21 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has long recognized a
public policy exception to vacatur in the labor arbitration context. In
United PaperworkersInternationalv. Misco,2 17 the Court said a court's
refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would
violate some explicit public policy that is "well defined and dominant,
and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interests. 21 8 The
Court applied this holding to reverse a district court judge's vacatur of an
arbitrator's reinstatement of a worker terminated for drug use; the district
court had ordered the dismissal of the worker because it said
reinstatement would violate the public policy against the operation of
dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs.
214.

Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

215. Id. at 936-42.
216. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §178 (1981) ("When a term is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.2,

at 332-33 (1982) ("One policy that has endured is that against the commission or
inducement of torts and similar wrongs."); J. CALAMARI & J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS 781 (2d ed. 1977). See, e.g., Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744, 745
(N.Y. 1924) (holding that agreement by seller of automobile to give buyer incorrect bill
of sale to defraud insurance company is unenforceable because "the direct object of the
parties is to do an illegal act").
217. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). For earlier consideration of public policy defenses to the
enforcement of an arbitral award, see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int 'lUnion
of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (enforcement of collective bargaining
agreement would not compromise public policy requiring obedience to court orders or
public policy favoring voluntary compliance with Title VII).
218. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
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Misco came up in the collective bargaining context, and the
Supreme Court has never explicitly or impliedly extended it to the
commercial context under the FAA. Lower courts, however, have
applied it in the FAA context, 21 9 and the policy concerns supporting
limited vacatur under federal labor law are similar to the policy concerns
supporting limited vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act, under
which commercial arbitration arises.22 ° In the labor context, limited
judicial review of arbitration serves the strong federal policy favoring the
settlement of labor disputes by arbitration as an alternative to the strike
or other forms of workplace disruption. 221 In the commercial context,
limited judicial review serves the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution preferred by Congress in
cases in which the FAA applies.222 Both contexts recognize the
importance of finality as an arbitration process characteristic and value,
and yet both contexts have recognized a public policy exception to the
general rule of finality.
The public policy exception is well-grounded and well-established,
and nothing in the Hall Street opinion evinces an intent to eliminate it. It
seems likely that courts will recognize a public policy exception to the
seemingly strict rule of Hall Street, at least for illegal arbitration awards.
Parties should not be expected to break the law in order to comply with
an arbitration award. Less certain is whether courts will extend that
exception to include the broader class of "well defined and dominant"
policies recognized in Misco. 223 Time will tell.
219. See, e.g., Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951
(Utah 1996) (considering, but not finding, award violated public policy); PrudentialBache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Bowles Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
220. For a discussion, see LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN, & RICHARD A. BALES,
ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 11-12 (2d ed. 2005).
221. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 7 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., Supp. 2008, 5th ed. 1996); see also United Paperworkers
Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) ("The refusal of courts to review the
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would
be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards." (citing United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960))).
222. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) ("Congress declared
a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew [the states' power] to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed to solve by
arbitration."); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is in the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.").
223. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43-44
(1987).
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Manifest Disregard Review

The availability of manifest disregard review was a nettlesome issue
before Hall Street, and remains difficult after the opinion. On the one
hand, the Court's broad limitation of vacatur to the statutory grounds
would seem to foreclose manifest disregard review because manifest
disregard is a common law ground rather than a statutory ground.
However, there are at least two plausible arguments that the doctrine
survives Hall Street.
The first is tied to the statute itself, and can be thought of as a
labeling argument.
As discussed above,224 the Hall Street Court
speculated that manifest disregard may simply be a label for judicial
review under some or all of the statutory grounds. Under this view,
manifest disregard survives because it is merely a way of describing the
statutory grounds; it is not an independent ground for vacatur. This
argument is not persuasive, however, because it presupposes a very
different understanding of manifest disregard than what courts have
traditionally interpreted the doctrine to mean. As discussed above, courts
traditionally have understood manifest disregard to mean that the
arbitrator knew the law and deliberately ignored it in reaching a
decision. 225 This is a far cry from the fraud, partiality, and misconduct
that lie at the heart of the first three statutory grounds. The fourth
statutory ground, exceeding-powers review, presents a closer call,
because it is technically possible to fit the lack of fidelity to the law
within exceeding-powers review, as discussed above.226 However,
because it would frustrate the process characteristics and values of
arbitration under the FAA, as also discussed above, 227 manifest disregard
review should not be viewed as synonymous with exceeding-powers
review.
The second argument that manifest disregard survives derives from
what the Court did not do: expressly repudiate the manifest disregard
doctrine. 8
Instead, the Court simply refused to "accord it the
significance that Hall Street urges": that manifest disregard means that
courts can vacate arbitral awards that are based on mere errors of law.229
Since the Court did not affirmatively disavow its manifest disregard
dictum, one may argue that the common law standard for manifest

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra notes 108-09.
See supra note 61.
See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
Id. at 1404.
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disregard-knowledge of the law and deliberate disregard of it-remains
intact.
The arguments for and against the continued viability of manifest
disregard in the wake of Hall Street are compelling and have generated
support in the lower courts since Hall Street. Some courts have held that
manifest disregard is dead after Hall Street because it is not a ground that
is expressly included in the Section 10(a) grounds for vacatur. 23 At the
same time, some courts have held that manifest disregard doctrine does
survive Hall Street, citing primarily both the labeling and repudiation

230. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, No. 07-20670, 2009 WL
542780, at *8 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2009) (manifest disregard of the law is no longer an
independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA); Prime Therapeutics
LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998 (D. Minn. 2008) (interpreting Hall
Street as the end of manifest disregard review); ALS & Assocs., Inc. v. AGM Marine
Constructors, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2008) ("[Mlanifest disregard of the law
is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under
the [FAA]." (quoting Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)));
Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
("the manifest disregard standard is no longer good law"); Hereford v. DR. Horton, Inc.,
No. 1070396, 2008 WL 4097594, at *5 (Ala. Sept. 5, 2008) ("[M]anifest disregard of the
law is no longer an independent and proper basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for
vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitrator's award.").
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rationales.2 3 ' Still other courts have simply found that it is an open
question. 2
Clearly, the U.S. Supreme Court is going to need to step in to
resolve the schism in the lower courts and to settle the question once and
for all. When it does, the Court should finally lay the ghost of manifest
disregard to rest. For so-called general submissions to arbitration, in
which the arbitrator is not instructed to follow the law, manifest
disregard review is bad policy. For so-called "restricted submissions," in
which the arbitrator is directed to follow the law, manifest disregard of
the law is unnecessary because restricted submissions are generally not
available after Hall Street.

231. See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th
Cir. 2009) ("Hall Street Associates did not undermine the manifest disregard of law
ground for vacatur."); Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir.
2008) (vacating an arbitration award on grounds of manifest disregard); Parnell v.
Tremont Capital Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-0752-cv, 2008 WL 2229442, at *1 (2d Cir. May
30, 2008) (recognizing manifest disregard standard); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.
NL Indus., 553 F. Supp. 2d 733 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (acknowledging, applying, but not
finding manifest disregard after Hall Street); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing continuing viability of manifest
disregard); MasTec N. Am., Inc. v. MSE Power Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325,
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating Hall Street limits manifest disregard to the Section 10 bases);
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (viewing
manifest disregard as an interpretation of Section 10); Reeves v. Chase Bank USA, NA,
No. 4:07CVIlI1 HEA, 2008 WL 2783231, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 2008) (finding
manifest disregard to be a ground for vacatur); Fitzgerald v. H&R Block Financial
Advisors, Inc., No. 08-10784, 2008 WL 2397636, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2008)
(noting that manifest disregard of the law is a separate standard, distinct from the FAA);
LaPine v. Kyocera Corp., No. C 07-06132 MHP, 2008 WL 2168914, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2008) (recognizing manifest disregard is coextensive with exceeding powers
review); Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC v. Kelsey, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037 (C.D. Ill.
2008) (finding manifest disregard is available where arbitrator directs parties to violate
the law); Joseph Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Cikanek, No 08 C 706, 2008 WL 2705445, at *4
(N.D. I11.July 9, 2008) ("[W]e have defined 'manifest disregard of the law' so narrowly
that it fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory ground-'where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers."' (citing Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC., 450 F.3d 265,
268-69 (7th Cir. 2006))).
232. See, e.g., DMA Int'l v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, No. 08-CV-00358-WDM-BNB,
2008 WL 4216261, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2008) (not deciding impact of Hall Street on
precedents authorizing manifest disregard review); see also Rogers v. KBR Technical
Servs. Inc., No. 08-20036, 2008 WL 2337184, at *2 (5th Cir. June 9, 2008) (recognizing
that Hall Street "calls into the doubt" the continuing existence of manifest disregard but
court declines to decide whether or not the doctrine exists); Acuna v. Aerofreeze, Inc.,
No. 2:06-CV-432 (TJW), 2008 WL 4755749, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2008) (opting to
analyze case under manifest disregard standard after noting that Eighth Circuit has not
yet clearly ruled on the vitality of manifest disregard); Millmaker v. Bruso, No. H-073837, 2008 WL 4560624, at *6 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2008) (same); COKeM Int'l, Ltd.
v. Riverdeep, Inc., Nos. 06-CV-3331 (PJS/RLE), 06-CV-3359 (PJS/RLE), 2008 WL
4417323, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2008) (finding no basis for vacatur "even assuming
that this remains a proper ground for vacatur after Hall Street").
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a.

General Submissions to Arbitration

Manifest disregard has no place in the modern structure of
arbitration for general submissions to arbitration-that is, submissions to
arbitration that do not call for the arbitrator to apply the law. As noted
above,233 manifest disregard is a paternalistic remnant of the era of
judicial distrust of arbitration that undermines party autonomy, relies on
an unsupported rationale, and ultimately is nonsensical.
i.

Manifest disregard undermines party autonomy

If courts actually applied manifest disregard on a regular basis, the
doctrine would undermine the principle of party autonomy by depriving
parties of their ability to have disputes decided by norms other than law.
For general submissions, arbitrators have the discretion to use nonlegal standards for their decisions, such as industry customs and
standards. This discretion and flexibility of judgment is one of the
process values and characteristics of arbitration that the parties are
bargaining for when they choose the arbitration process. The availability
of manifest disregard review would frustrate this discretion, however.
Consider the arbitrator in a generally submitted employment wrongful
termination case who permits parties to argue the law but then
determines that the case is better decided on the grounds of the practices
of that particular workplace, such that the ultimate award is inconsistent
with the known law. If manifest disregard is taken seriously, such an
award should be subject to vacatur because the arbitrator knew the law
and deliberately ignored it, resulting in a decision that is in manifest
disregard of the law. Yet such a result would undermine party autonomy
by invalidating the very reasons the parties chose the arbitration process
to resolve their dispute: to get the arbitrator's best judgment as to the
best resolution of the dispute.
Continuing to apply the manifest disregard standard also creates
peculiar incentives for the arbitrator with respect to the rule of law. For
one, the arbitrator has the incentive to avoid consulting the law that is
applicable to the dispute. Recall that the standard for manifest disregard
review is that the arbitrator's award was inconsistent with the law, that
the arbitrator knew what the law was and deliberately disregarded it.
Under this standard, the arbitrator is better off simply not knowing what
the law is-hear no evil, see no evil, do no evil.23 4

undesirable

233.
234.

and

inconsistent

with

arbitration's

This seems

liberal

rule

See supra notes 44-49.
For fuller discussion, see Reuben, Process Purity,supra note 44, at 305-06.
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admissibility of evidence,235 including evidence of legal standards;
parties may be better served, at least in some if not many cases, if the
arbitrator at least considers the law for what it is worth. Continuing to
apply manifest disregard also leads to a disincentive for arbitrators to
draft written opinions that would reveal their reasoning-including
whether they knew and considered applying the law. Again, this seems
normatively undesirable given that research has shown that written
awards give parties greater satisfaction in adjudicated awards.236
When they contract to take their cases out of the public system,
parties are opting for an informal system of "rough justice," and the
possibility of the abnormal award is simply one of those risks that is a
part of the parties' bargain to arbitrate rather than decide their disputes in
a court of law. By giving the courts the final say over an arbitral award,
manifest disregard promotes paternalism of the law rather than autonomy
of the parties to have their disputes decided notwithstanding the law.
ii.

Manifest disregard relies on an unsupported rationale

The principal warrant for manifest disregard is that the possibility of
judicial review keeps arbitrators honest, and allows for grievous errors to
be remedied. Therefore, its utility should be measured by the degree to
which it accomplishes this goal. Unfortunately, there is no evidence
whatsoever upon which the claim is based. To the contrary, it is sheer
speculation that manifest disregard achieves this salutary effect. Given
the paucity of awards that have actually been vacated on manifest
disregard grounds, the claim seems barely plausible on its face.237
Deterrence theory suggests that at least intermittent enforcement is
necessary for a rule to have some effect.238
Even if manifest disregard had some deterrent effect, it is by no
means clear that it is the most significant constraining force on arbitral
decision-making. Rather, if there is going to be a real constraining force
on the "bizarre" arbitration award, the reputational market would seem
more likely.239 Competition for arbitration business is fierce, with much
235. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 221, at 407.
236. See, e.g., Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities
Arbitration:An EmpiricalStudy, 2009 J. Disp. RESOL. 349 (finding in survey of securities
industry arbitration that 55.48 percent of investors said they would have been more
satisfied if they had an explanation of the award).
237. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.

238.

For the seminal work on deterrence theory, see Gary Becker, Crime and

Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968) (concluding that

because the cost of increasing the fine is marginal to that of the cost of increasing
surveillance, the best public policy is to maximize the fine and to minimize surveillance).
239. For discussion of reputational effects, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
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of the work going to senior members of what is in effect a "good old
boys" club.240 Reputation is the arbitrator's stock in trade, ultimately
determining whether the arbitrator will be selected for cases or will not.
Again, it is an empirical question beyond the scope of this article, but
common sense suggests that an arbitrator is more likely to be careful in
rendering the award because of concerns about his reputation than for
fear of being vacated because of manifest disregard of the law, especially
when application of the doctrine is so rare.
iii.

Manifest disregard is ultimately nonsensical

For general submissions to arbitration, manifest disregard review is
ultimately nonsensical. Because the arbitrator is not required to follow
the law, it makes little sense to evaluate the arbitrator's decision on the
basis of how well it complies with the law. Indeed, if the arbitral
decision is not based on law and is instead based on some other norm,
such as industry custom or practice, manifest disregard effectively
constitutes a substitution of judgment by the court for the decision of the
arbitrator.
b.

Restricted Submissions

The foregoing discussion applies to general submissions in which
the arbitrator has no constraints on her judgment. So-called restricted
submissions, which compel the arbitrator to apply the law, 241 require
additional analysis.
With restricted submissions, the arbitrator may make an initial
decision on the law, but the parties reserve for the court the power to
make a final decision, thus allowing for judicial review for questions of
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 522-46 (1994) (discussing how the lawyer's
reputational market can assist in sorting among types of lawyers); Paul M. Schwartz &
Edward J. Janger, Notification ofData Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 929-32
(2007) (discussing use of reputational sanctions to influence firm behavior in providing
data security); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
Collaboration: The End of Legal Professionalism and the Beginning of Professional
Pluralism, 90 U. ILL. L. REV. 475, 485-97 (2005) (discussing importance of reputation to
collaborative lawyers).
240. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

30-31 (1996) (noting, in international context, a community "often referred to as a clubconnected by personal and professional relations cemented by conferences, journals, and
actual arbitrations").
241. Significantly, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), the taproot of manifest
disregard, was a case involving an unrestricted submission. See generally C.J.S.
Arbitration, Matters Which May Be Ordered, Awarded, or Decided Under SubmissionGeneral, Special or Restricted Submission § 161 (2005) (outlining and defining the
difference between general and specific submission in the case of arbitration disputes).
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law. This is an arbitrability issue in that the parties simply are
withholding final decisional authority over questions of law in their
submission, thus retaining the status quo for final decisions on questions
of law: judicial review.
One important consequence of the Hall Street decision is to limit
the degree to which parties may engage in restricted submissions.
Indeed, one could forcefully argue that the opinion invalidates restricted
submissions because its narrow holding is that parties may not contract
for judicial review by a public court of law. In this regard, it is important
to remember that the Hall Street agreement itself was a restricted
submission that was rejected by the Court as being beyond the
contracting capacity of the parties.
While Hall Street thus limits the availability of restricted
submissions, it need not be read to eliminate them entirely. As described
above, the parties may still engage in restricted submissions under Hall
Street, so long as the review is by a private arbitrator rather than a public
court.242 What Hall Street prohibits is substantive judicial review by
public courts of law, not substantive review as a categorical matter, as
discussed above. Parties may still engage in restricted submissions that
would permit substantive judicial review by private arbitrators, who can
issue decisions that are fully enforceable arbitration awards.
4.

Contracted Judicial Review

The foregoing discussion illustrates the significant impact that Hall
Street likely will have on non-statutory grounds for judicial review of
arbitration awards. Arbitrary and capricious and irrationality review
should be treated as eliminated under the case. Manifest disregard
review, too, should be viewed as no longer available after Hall Street.
And while courts may be tempted to treat public policy review as
superseded by the opinion, the better view is that it survives Hall Street,
at least for claims that an arbitration award is itself illegal.
Contracted judicial review is the fourth non-statutory ground, and
the one directly presented in the Hall Street case. Ironically, it may
represent one of the strongest non-statutory grounds after Hall Street. In
a separate Part IV, a lengthy passage of dictum, 243 the Court raised the
possibility that contracted judicial review might be possible if the

242. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
243. I refer to dictum here in the technical sense of not being essential to the court's
holding that the statutory grounds are exclusive. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102
(8th ed. 2004) (defining "obiter dictum" as "[a] judicial comment made while delivering
a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)").
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arbitration was conducted under authority other than the FAA, such as
state statutory law or the common law, or that of the courts.2 4 4 While this
part of the opinion is perhaps the most obscure, it may well prove the
most significant, important for both the law of vacatur, as well as the law
of FAA preemption more generally.
a.

Part IV of the Hall Street Opinion

Part IV of the opinion was the culmination of a flash of the Court's
own insight into the issues that began with a question at oral arguments.
Justice Breyer had asked whether the agreement should be treated as an
exercise of the district court's authority to manage its cases under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.245
The Court later ordered
supplemental briefing on the questions of whether authority existed
outside of the FAA upon which parties could rely for purposes of
contracting for judicial review, whether the parties in fact relied upon
such authority, and whether the petitioners in this case had waived the
right to rely on such authority before the high court.24 6
"The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review
of arbitration awards, 247 the Court later explained in Part IV of the
opinion. "They may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or
common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is
arguable. 2 48 The unusual posture of the Hall Street case presented a
third option: that the agreement to arbitrate could arise under the
authority of the courts, specifically Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.
After all, in Hall Street, the arbitration agreement was entered into
during the course of the district court litigation, and was adopted as a
249
court order by the district court.
The Court's intellectual sojourn stopped there, however, as the
Court acknowledged that the parties and the lower courts before it had
relied on the FAA as the primary source of authority governing the
arbitration provision at issue. 250 The Court also acknowledged that the
Rule 16 issue implicated issues of waiver and the interplay of the FAA
with Rule 16 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 that
were not argued below or at the Supreme Court. 251 Therefore, the Court

244.
245.

989).
246.
247.

Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-

See supra note 103.
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.

248. Id.
249. Id. at 1407.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1407-08.
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concluded it could not decide these issues in the first instance, and left
them for further consideration by the Ninth Circuit Court on remand.252
b.

Vacatur

The Court's dictum strongly suggests three sources of authority that
parties may rely upon if they want to have contracted judicial review:
state statutory law, the state common law of contract, and the inherent
authority of the courts. Under this approach, the parties would not rely
on the Federal Arbitration Act for the enforcement of their arbitration
award; rather, they would look to these other sources of authority. For
the reasons briefly sketched below, it seems likely that all three may be
successful vehicles for the enforcement of arbitration provisions calling
for substantive judicial review.
i.

State statutes

All states have arbitration statutes, most of which are modeled after
the Uniform Arbitration Act 2 53 or the more recent Revised Uniform

Arbitration Act ("RUAA").254 Neither uniform law directly authorizes
contracted judicial review of an arbitration award, and indeed, the
drafters of the RUAA declined to include such a provision.25 5 New
Jersey, for example, has a statute in place that provides for contracted
judicial review of arbitration awards.256
Still other states may construe their arbitration laws to allow for
contracted review. California has already taken that step in Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc.,257 ruling shortly after Hall Street was
decided that under California Arbitration Act (CAA)2 58 "parties may

252.

Id.

253. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws says the
Uniform Arbitration Act has been adopted by 49 jurisdictions. See Uniform Law
Commissioners,
Final Acts
and Legislation,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=60 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
254. As of this writing, 13 jurisdictions had passed the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act: Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. See
Uniform Law Commissioners, Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
255. See Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues
Under the Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 67, 84-85 (2001).
256. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4(c) (West 2003) ("nothing in this act shall preclude
the parties from expanding the scope of judicial review of an award by expressly
providing for such expansion").
257. 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008).
258. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2008).
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obtain judicial review of the merits [of an arbitration award] by express
agreement. 259
The Cable Connection court's holding turned on language contained
in an earlier case, Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,260 in which that court
stated that "'in the absence of some limiting clause in the arbitration
agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of law,
may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute.' 261 Using this
language along with dicta in some other cases, 62 the Cable Connection
court stated that under its precedents "[i]f the parties constrain the
arbitrators' authority by requiring a dispute to be decided according to
the rule of law, and make plain their intention that the award is
rule of limited review [is]
reviewable for legal error, the general
263
displaced by the parties' agreement.,
The Cable Connection court distinguished Hall Street by noting that
Part IV of the Hall Street opinion "left the door ajar for alternate routes
to an expanded scope of review. 26 4 It observed that the parties did not
specify in their contract whether enforcement proceedings were to be
brought in state or federal court, and stated that Section 10 and Section
11 of the FAA only apply to review by "the United States court in and
for the district where the award was made. 265 It then proceeded to rule
that the arbitration was conducted under the California arbitration statute
because the petition to vacate in Cable Connection "was filed, argued,
both
and appealed in state court, and before the Hall Street decision
266
controlling.,
was
CAA
the
that
theory
the
on
parties proceeded
The Cable Connection court also declined to view Hall Street as
"persuasive authority for a restrictive interpretation of the review
provisions in the CAA. ' ' 267 The court relied on Moncharsh and the
259. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 589.
260. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
261. Id. at 912 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Crofoot v. Blair
Holdings Corp., 260 P.2d 156, 186 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)).
262. See, e.g., Baize v. Eastridge Cos., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)

(noting that an expanded scope of review would be available under a clause specifically
tailored for that purpose); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (same). But see, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to enforce a contract

clause calling for judicial review of an arbitration award on its merits); Crowell v.
Downey Comm. Hosp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
263. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 600.

264. Id. at 596.
265. Id. at 597 n.12 (quoting 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), 11 (a) (2006)).
266. Id. This explanation is not entirely satisfying in light of the fact that Section C
of the arbitration contract stated "[tihis Section and any arbitration conducted hereunder
shall be governed by the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Section 1, et seq.)." Id.
at 590 n.3.
267. Id. at 600.
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legislative history of the CAA to distinguish the state statute from the
FAA.2 68 Both of those authorities favored effectuating the intent of
contracting parties even to the extent of altering the usual scope of
review with respect to arbitration awards.269 In the view of the California
Supreme Court, "[t]he scope of judicial review is not invariably limited
by statute; rather, 'the parties, simply by agreeing to arbitrate, are
deemed to accept limited judicial review by implication.' 2 70 Hall Street
notwithstanding, "[i]t follows
that [parties] may expressly agree to accept
271
review.,
of
scope
broader
a
Cable Connection plainly sets up a model that is an alternative to
Hall Street for states that want to endorse contracted judicial review of
arbitration awards. One can imagine that at least some other states may
take the Cable Connection approach rather than the Hall Street approach.
ii.

State contract law

Part IV of the Hall Street opinion further suggested that state
contract law could provide a basis for providing for contracted judicial
review of arbitration awards. Under this approach, the parties would not
rely on the Federal Arbitration Act or their state arbitration statutes for
the enforcement of the award, but rather would state in their contractual
arbitration provisions that the enforcement of the award was based on
principles of state contract law.
A comprehensive review of state contract laws is beyond the scope
of this article, but courts have expressed a willingness to enforce such
contracts as long as they do not call for review according to standards
that are unfamiliar to the courts. The standards that parties ask the courts
to use are important to the courts, as the famous concurrence of Judge
Alex Kozinski in Lapine Technology v. Kyocera attests.2 72 Kozinski
concurred with the majority decision to permit contracted substantive
review, taking comfort that the work it would create for the courts was
no different than the work that district courts perform on "appeals from
administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, or on habeas corpus. 2 73
But he said he would "call the case differently if the agreement provided

268. See id. at 599-602.
269. See id. at 602 ("In California, the policy favoring arbitration without the
complications of traditional judicial review is based on the parties' expectations as
embodied in their agreement, and the CAA rests on the same foundation.").
270. Id. (quoting Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 239 (Cal. 1999)).
271. Id.
272. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled by,
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
273. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891.
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that the district judge would review274 the award by flipping a coin or
studying the entrails of a dead fowl.
Similarly, the Cable Connection court found that concerns about
unfamiliar standards of review are "unfounded., 275 The court said it had
"discovered no case where the parties attempted to make the courts apply
an unusual standard of review., 276 The court further noted that "just as
the parties to any contract are limited in the constraints they may place
on judicial review," standards such as Kozinski's "'flipping a coin or
studying the entrails of a dead fowl' would be unenforceable,"
presumably on public policy grounds.277
As long as the standards are consistent with the types of standards
that courts are accustomed to applying, courts may be willing to enforce
contracts with judicial review provisions on state contract grounds.
iii.

Inherent authority

The Court's opinion finally suggests that parties may be able to call
upon the inherent powers of the courts to manage their dockets as a basis
for contracting for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. The
Hall Street case itself provides a good example. The parties had agreed
to have a discrete issue in the litigation decided by an arbitrator, and to
have that arbitral award subject to review by the court that retained
continuing jurisdiction over the case.278 Courts have already been
recognized as having the "inherent power" to "manage their own affairs
' 2 79
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. ,
This inherent power has been held to include the power to dismiss an
action based on forum non conveniens,28 ° the power to vacate its own
judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon it, 281 and the
power to punish for contempt.2 82 Again, courts may have little trouble
extending such power to include the judicial review of an arbitration
award issued pursuant to an agreement of the parties in pending
litigation, so long as the agreement called for review according to
standards that are familiar to courts.

274. Id.
275. Cable Connection, 109 P.3d at 605.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-01 (2008).
279. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
280. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947).
281. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 24850 (1944).
282. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873).
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Preemption

FAA preemption has historically been viewed as broad. After all,
the Court had ruled in Southland v. Keating that the FAA preempts state
laws that are hostile to the enforcement of an arbitration provision. 283
The Court later applied that principle to find FAA preemption of a state
law that merely required notice of an arbitration provision to be
conspicuous in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarroto,284 and held that
the FAA and its principle of preemption reached conduct at the furthest
reach of Congress' Commerce Power in Allied Bruce Terminix
2 85
Companies v. Dobson.
The Cable Connection court recognized the significance of the
preemption issue raised by Hall Street, but rejected the argument that the
CAA was preempted by the FAA.286 The court reasoned that if the
Supreme Court had intended to "impose a uniform national policy
requiringjudicial review solely on the grounds stated in the FAA,, 287 it
would not have left open other avenues for judicial review such as those
provided by state statutory or common law or the trial court's review
under its inherent power to manage its docket.288 Accordingly, the court
concluded that "the Hall Street holding is restricted to proceedings to
review arbitration awards under the FAA, and does not require state law
to conform with its limitations. 289
Several additional arguments against preemption were persuasive to
the Cable Connection court. The first is that FAA preemption is
primarily concerned with state laws that would contravene the
enforcement provisions of Section 2 of the FAA. 29 ' This has certainly
been the Court's emphasis in the Court's major FAA preemption
cases.2 9 1 A related argument is that the FAA's vacatur provision, Section
10, is a procedural rule that is directed to "the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made, 292 and therefore does not
283. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1984).
284. See 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
285. See 513 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1995).
286. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 109 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008) ("[W]e
do not believe that the Hall Street majority intended to declare a policy with preemptive
effect in all cases involving interstate commerce.").
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1407 (2008)).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 597.
291. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-688 (1996);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-273 (1995); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-491 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
(1984).
292. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
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preempt contrary state laws.29 3 Other sections of the FAA, most notably
Sections 3 and 4, have been found to reflect Congress' intent to limit the
applications of those provisions to the federal courts.294

A third

argument is that the provisions of the CAA did not undermine the policy
of the FAA; to the contrary, to the extent that the policy of the FAA is to
authorizing
enforce the agreement of the parties, 295 state law provisions
296
party contracted review agreements promote that policy.
The Cable Connection court's reliance on Part IV of the Hall Street
opinion is well placed. It hardly seems that the Court would have opened
the door to the state law and inherent powers approaches if the Court
believed they were preempted.
The other rationales reflect other approaches to preemption that
297
have been used by courts or proposed by legal commentators. 9 In a
trenchant analysis of FAA preemption decisions and scholarship,
Professor Drahozal provides a helpful framework for determining
whether "second generation" state arbitration laws-that is, laws that
focus on arbitration procedures rather than the enforceability of
arbitration provisions-would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act. 298 A state law permitting contracted judicial review of an arbitration
award would be such a "second generation" state arbitration law.
"Step One" of the analysis asks: "Does the State Law Apply to
Contracts Generally or Does it Single Out Arbitration Agreements for
Special] Treatment?" 299 This step implements the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions in Southland Corp. v. Keating,300 Allied-Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson,30 1 and Doctor'sAssociates v. Casarroto.30 2 As discussed above,
under those decisions, state laws that single out arbitration provision for
special 3 treatment or are hostile to arbitration are preempted by the
FAA.

30

293. Cable Connection, 109 P.3d at 597.
294. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.10; Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Servs., 35
Cal.4th 376, 389-390 (Cal. 2005).
295. See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
296. Cable Connection, 109 P.3d at 598.
297. For a discussion, see generally Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitrationAct
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, Preemption].
298. Id. at 395.
299. Id. at 408.
300. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (FAA preempts California state law anti-waiver provision).
301. 513 U.S. 265 (1995) ("What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair
enough to enforce all its basic terms... but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
clause.").
302. 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (FAA preempts state law requiring notice of mandatory
arbitration provision in conspicuous type on first page of contract).
303. See notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
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"Step Two" of the analysis asks: "Have the Parties Contracted for
Application of the State Law to the Arbitration Proceeding? '30 4 This
step embraces the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University,305 as explained by Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc,30 6 and First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan.30 7 These decisions
emphasize that arbitration is a matter of contract, and that one of the
central policies of the FAA is to enforce the agreements of the parties as
they are written, even if the effect of the agreement is to displace the
FAA.
"Step Three" of the analysis asks: "Does the State Law Invalidate
the Parties' Agreement to Arbitrate? ' 30 8 This step recognizes the
primary force of Section 2's enforcement provisions, and the fact that the
first generation cases have focused on the preemption of state law
provisions that would have invalidated an otherwise valid arbitration
provision. 30 9 This is the core of FAA preemption.
"Step Four" of the analysis asks whether the statute is valid under
five different theories of FAA preemption:
The Keystone Theory-based on the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems, Corp.,310 the Keystone theory
of preemption holds that "[a] state law is not preempted, even if it singles
out arbitration, so long11 as the law does not invalidate the parties'
3
arbitration agreement.
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act Theory-based on the
approach taken by the drafters of the RUAA, this approach consists of a
continuum of preemption. 3 12 On one side of the continuum are so-called
"front end" issues, including the agreement to arbitrate and the
arbitrability of the dispute, and "back end issues," including
modification, confirmation, and vacatur of the award, that are most likely
to be preempted.31 3 On the other end of the continuum are state laws that
deal with so-called "procedural" issues, including discovery and
immunity, which are less likely to be preempted.3 14 In between are so304.

Drahozal, Preemption, supra note 297, at 411.

305. 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (parties may agree to have arbitration covered by state law
rather than FAA, even if the state law would otherwise be preempted by the FAA).
306. 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (distinguishing Volt as a case in which it deferred to the
California courts' interpretation of a contract).
307.

514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).

308.

Drahozal, Preemption,supra note 297, at 415.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).
Drahozal, Preemption,supra note 297, at 417.
Id.
Hayford, supra note 255, at 74-75.
Id. at 76.
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called "borderline issues," including punitive damages
and provisional
31 5
awards, on which a given court can go either way.
The Anti-FAA theory-Professors Ian Macneil, Richard Speidel,
and Thomas Stipanowich suggest that a state arbitration law will be
preempted if it "limit[s] or obstruct[s] explicit FAA provisions or general
federal arbitration law."'3 ' In other words, as Drahozal puts it, the
provision is "anti-FAA."31 7
The Pro-ContractTheory-Professor Stephen Ware suggests that a
state arbitration law will be preempted if it conflicts with a provision of
the arbitration agreement. 31 8 For Ware, Section
2 "gives the terms of
319
law."
federal
of
force
the
agreements
arbitration
Applying Drahozal's framework to the issue of a hypothetical state
law authorizing judicial review shows some support for the notion that
state arbitration laws permitting contracted judicial review would survive
preemption.
Step 1-Does the state law single out arbitration for differential
treatment?-presents something of a barrier because a state law
authorizing parties to elect judicial review of arbitration awards clearly
would single out arbitration. However, the central concern with the
singling out of arbitration provisions is that they be singled out for nonenforcement. As the Supreme Court said in Allied-Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson, "What [S]tates may not do is decide that a contract is fair
enough to enforce all its basic terms... but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause." 320 A judicial review statute does not affect the
enforceability of all or part of an arbitration provision; it merely adds a
term to be enforced. To the extent that it singles out arbitration, it does
so in a way that is benign rather than hostile, and therefore, squarely falls
within Allied-Bruce and Doctor's Associates.
Step 2 of the analysis is less problematic. It questions whether the
parties have contracted for application of the state law to the arbitration
proceeding, and my hypothetical statute merely authorizes the parties to
contract to have their arbitration award subject to judicial review if they
agree to do so. As such, the provision would fall squarely within the
party agreements recognized by Volt and First Options.

315. Id. at75.
316. MACNEIL, supra note 6, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:93.
317. Drahozal, Preemption,supra note 297, at 418.
318. Id.
319. Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, Contracting Out of
Government's Role in Punishment and FederalPreemptionof State Law, 63 FORDHAM L.
REv. 529, 554 (1994).
320. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
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Step 3 is also not problematic. It asks whether the state law
invalidates the parties' agreement to arbitrate, and in my hypothetical, it
is simply a part of the agreement to arbitrate. While such an agreement
could lead to a judicial decision vacating an arbitral award that was
inconsistent with the law, in no way could the enforcement of the clause
invalidate the initial agreement to arbitrate.
The final step, Step 4, is more of a mixed bag. A state law
authorizing judicial review clearly would not be preempted under the
Keystone theory because it does not invalidate the arbitration provision,
as discussed above. Under the RUAA, a judicial review provision would
likely be preempted because it is a "back end" issue that "speak[s] to the
most essential dimensions of the commercial arbitration process (in that
[it] go[es] to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate and the role of the
judiciary in holding parties to those agreements). 32 1
This leaves two more theories. The first is the anti-FAA theory, and
the result here is ambiguous. On the one hand, a state judicial review
law would not interfere with the express language of the FAA. On the
other, it would undermine the FAA's principle of finality, upon which
the Hall Street majority in part rested its reasoning. The final theory is
Professor Ware's contract theory, which would be no barrier here as the
state law authorizing judicial review would be reinforcing a term in the
contract rather than interfering with it.
In sum, as a general matter these theories tend to show some
support for the idea that a state law authorizing parties to contract for
expanded judicial review would not be preempted. Indeed, to the extent
that Part IV of the Hall Street opinion tends to show that FAA
preemption is narrower than many have perceived, the opinion may
reach much farther than the mere vacatur context presented by Hall
Street Associates.
d.

A Process Characteristics and Values Caveat

In this section, we have discussed the importance of Part IV of the
Hall Street opinion for the law of vacatur and for the law of preemption.
For vacatur, the impact is to shift efforts to enforce judicial review
provisions away from the FAA and toward state law and the courts
themselves, forums that may well be hospitable to such claims.
Although not certain, it seems likely that such efforts would not be
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because they do not invalidate
the agreement to arbitrate or interfere with the policies of the Federal
Arbitration Act.
321.

Hayford, supra note 255, at 75.

2009]

PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND VACATUR AFTER HALL STREET

1161

While party agreements for substantive judicial review of arbitration
awards may thus be lawful under state law and the inherent power of the
courts, that does not mean that courts and legislatures should take
advantage of this opportunity. To the contrary, state legislatures should
decline to pass laws permitting contracted judicial review. Similarly,
state and federal courts should not enforce party contracted review
agreements on public policy grounds.32 2
As discussed above, 3
contracted judicial review may honor party contractual intentions, but it
undermines many of the core process characteristics and values of the
arbitration process. In particular, it eviscerates finality, which is a
cornerstone of the arbitration process, and can lead to the formalization
of a process that is intended to be informal.324
From a process characteristics and values perspective, party desire
for contracted judicial review raises the question of what the parties
really want out of their dispute resolution process. By agreeing to
judicial review of arbitration awards, the parties manifest their intent to
have legal standards apply to their dispute. This is not inherently
problematic, but if this is what the parties want, they should select a
process that, unlike arbitration, relies upon the law throughout the
process. Staying with traditional courts is of course one option. While
such a selection would have the benefit of the law, it comes at the
sacrifice of other arbitration process virtues, such as informality,
efficiency, and privacy.
Another perhaps more attractive option would be to use the private
judging process, sometimes pejoratively called the "rent-a-judge"
process. 325 Available in many states, 326 parties under this process
essentially hire a retired or senior judge to preside over their case
privately, applying the law fully and rendering a decision that may be
entered as an enforceable court judgment, and which is fully reviewable
322. Issues of finality are implicated with much less force in the context of judicial
review of arbitration awards pursuant to agreements entered into as a part of a larger
litigation effort. It would therefore be proper for the courts to review arbitration awards
in this narrow context.
323. See notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
324. See id.
325. See generally Barlow F. Christensen, Private Justice: California's General
Reference Procedure, 1982 AM. BAR. FouND. RES. J. 79; Note, The CaliforniaRent-AJudge Experiment: Constitutionaland Policy Considerationsof Pay-As-You-Go Courts,
94 HARV. L. REv. 1592, 1599-1600 (1981); Anne S. Kim, Note, Rent-a-Judges and the
Cost of Selling Justice, 44 DuKE L.J. 166, 168-80 (1994).
326. The procedure was pioneered in California, but is also available in several other
jurisdictions, including Colorado, Indiana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington.
See Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment:
Constitutional and Policy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REv.
1592, 1594 (1981).
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by the state's appellate courts. From a process characteristics and values
perspective, private judging offers numerous advantages to parties who
want arbitration with judicial review. The process promotes autonomy
because its engagement is a choice of the parties, as is the selection of
the judge. It is more efficient because the parties do not have to wait for
court congestion to clear; a private judge can hear them immediately.
The decisionmaker will follow the law, and issue a decision that is both
enforceable and reviewable according to traditional legal standards.
Finally, while it is not as informal as arbitration, private judging does
share the arbitration virtue of privacy. For these reasons, private judging
may be a more fitting option for parties who want decisions to accord
with legal7 rules but do not want to engage in the traditional litigation
process.
V.

32

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Hall Street is a landmark by
anyone's definition. By limiting vacatur grounds to those expressly
enumerated in the statute, the Court rewrote the law of vacatur by
eliminating or casting doubt upon the many non-statutory common law
grounds for vacatur that have surfaced in the courts over the years. As I
have argued, courts should find most of those grounds-manifest
disregard, arbitrary and caprious, and irrationality-to be eliminated by
the Court's sweeping opinion. The narrow public policy vacatur ground
should survive the opinion to the extent it rests on the solid public policy
of preventing the enforcement of illegal arbitration awards.
Some will argue that the opinion reduces party autonomy by
precluding the parties from contracting for judicial review under the
Federal Arbitration Act.328 I take a contrary view, and believe the
opinion expands rather than contracts party autonomy in arbitration.
To the extent that parties want to continue to take advantage of the
streamlined confirmation procedures of the FAA, the Court's ruling
permits them to opt for substantive review by an arbitrator or an arbitral
panel. More significantly, perhaps, the opinion also provides parties the
autonomy to opt out of the FAA entirely if they want to pursue
substantive judicial review of their arbitration awards. The parties likely
will be able to agree to judicial review of arbitration awards and have
that agreement enforced as a matter of contract, rather than enforcing the
award under the FAA. As long as the agreement calls for the use of
327. For the classic work on tailoring particular disputes to dispute resolution
processes, see Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fittingthe Forum to the Fuss:
A User-FriendlyGuide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).
328. See, e.g., Rau, supra note 159.
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decisional standards that are familiar to the courts, it is likely that courts
will provide judicial review of arbitration awards pursuant to such
agreements. Further, parties may opt out of the FAA and proceed to
enforce the agreement under state arbitration laws, to the extent such
laws provide for or are construed to permit expanded substantive review.
Finally, courts may permit parties to choose to arbitrate discrete issues in
cases they are trying before a court, and agree to have those arbitral
awards reviewed by that court as a part of the court's inherent power to
control its docket.
It is difficult to see how the availability of such options constitutes a
meaningful contraction of autonomy in arbitration. True, it places an
outer limit in that the parties cannot, under Hall Street, fundamentally
alter the basic structure of the arbitration process under the FAA by
displacing finality with substantive legal review. But such a limitation
merely respects the differences in dispute resolution processes, and
compels parties to use processes that are appropriate to their goals and
objectives. For arbitration under the FAA, autonomy may be a cardinal
virtue of the arbitration process, but finality is its cornerstone.

